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Reward drives innovation.  For this reason, Congress has enacted a
system of patents, trademarks, and copyrights to incentivize innovation.
Such publicly ordered intellectual property regulation supports public
and private interests—mandating disclosure of the innovation while legis-
lating protection of that disclosure.  Increasingly, though, the legislated
incentives are proving insufficient for innovation, and innovators are rely-
ing on private incentives, undermining the fundamental balance of our
legal framework and maximizing the reward to innovators at the cost of
the public’s interest.  Enforcement of contracts that supplant legislation
rather than supplement it contravenes public policy and vitiates the pub-
lic’s interest.  It is time to reform public ordering to protect the public’s
interest while providing sufficient reward to incentivize innovation.
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INTRODUCTION
INTELLECTUAL property laws incentivize innovation and grant innova-tors limited exclusivity in return for their contribution to the storehouse
of public knowledge.  That limited reward is not enough for all markets,
however.  Faced with pressure to increase returns on their investments in
research and development, intellectual property owners are circum-
venting the legislative restrictions and enhancing their bottom line
through contracts.  Replacing legislated protection with private ordering
vitiates the protections for public interest inherent in public ordering and
reduces the dedication of innovations to the public while increasing the
cost to the consumer.1  Licenses protect those with market power and pri-
oritize the innovator’s interest over the public’s interest.
Private ordering has become the dominant form of intellectual prop-
erty protection in many areas—due, in no small part—to the poor fit of
the modern technology and the aging intellectual property system.  When
licenses are used to supplement the public protections—promoting inno-
vation in fields that provide insufficient public incentives—then such pri-
vate ordering is in the public’s interest.  Contests, prizes, and competitions
have their place in promoting innovation.2  Private ordering cannot, how-
1. Private ordering is used in this article to describe the scenario where par-
ties privately bargain for protection, through the use of contracts, industry norms,
or other measures.  Public ordering is used to refer to protection codified in legis-
lation, such as the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat.
284 (2011).
2. See, e.g., Jonathan Bays, Tony Goland, & Joe Newsum, Using Prizes to Spur
Innovation, MCKINSEY & CO. (July 1, 2009), https://www.mckinsey.com/business-
functions/strategy-and-corporate-finance/our-insights/using-prizes-to-spur-innova-
tion# [https://perma.cc/D6DU-LXJX] (“When are prizes more effective than
other kinds of philanthropic instruments?  Our research suggests that three condi-
tions are paramount: a clear objective (for example, one that is measurable and
achievable within a reasonable time frame), the availability of a relatively large
population of potential problem solvers, and a willingness on the part of partici-
pants to bear some of the costs and risks.  Teams competing for the $10 million
Ansari X PRIZE to develop spacecraft capable of entering space and returning
safely twice within ten days, for instance, spent more than $100 million in the pur-
suit.”); Tyler Cowen, $1 Million Plus in Emergent Ventures Prizes for Coronavirus Work,
MARGINAL REVOLUTION (Mar. 13, 2020, 9:00 AM), https://marginalrevolu-
tion.com/marginalrevolution/2020/03/1-million-plus-in-emergent-ventures-
prizes-for-coronavirus-work.html [https://perma.cc/5MM5-WXEV] (“I believe
that we should be using prizes to help innovate and combat the coronavirus.
When are prizes better than grants?  The case for prizes is stronger when you don’t
know who is likely to make the breakthrough, you value the final output more than
the process, there is an urgency to solutions (talent development is too slow), suc-
cess is relatively easy to define, and efforts and investments are likely to be un-
dercompensated.  All of these apply to the threat from the coronavirus.”); Daniel
Hemel & Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, Want a Coronavirus Vaccine, Fast?  Here’s a Solu-
tion, TIME (Mar. 4, 2020, 8:00 AM), https://time.com/5795013/coronavirus-vac-
cine-prize-challenge/ (“[T]he federal government can ensure that a vaccine would
be cheap—or even free—while giving the private sector powerful incentives to
pour resources into vaccine research . . . [by creating] a prize [that] will assure
private-sector enterprises that they will be financially rewarded for a coronavirus
3
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ever, be allowed to supplant public ordering.  Congress and the courts
have placed restrictions on legislative protections to enhance and protect
the public’s interest.3  Allowing intellectual property owners to undermine
that interest in the quest for market control and profitability betrays the
bargain set forth in the intellectual property system.  Contracts are being
used to extend the intellectual property laws in ways not envisioned by
legislators at the time of enactment and to erode the boundaries of intel-
lectual property protection.  Congress and the courts need to closely ex-
amine private ordering to ensure that the protections established through
contract are not those dedicated to the public.  For instance, a patent gives
a patentee a limited right to exclude others from making, using, selling, or
offering for sale the patented innovation for a limited period.4  In return,
the patentee agrees to enable its competitors to use the technology after
the expiration of the patent term.  Innovators are using the patent term to
build up goodwill and brand recognition in technology, and then using
licenses to exclude competitors from access to the patented technology
after the patent terms expire, extending that goodwill and brand recogni-
tion far beyond the patent term.5  At the time that a patent is issued, the
patentee is aware that competitors have the right to make, use, and sell the
invention at the end of the patent term.  When patentees contract around
these explicit restrictions and prevent competitors from accessing the
technology through a contract, such contracts should not be enforced.
There is a fundamental shift occurring—away from public ordering and
towards private ordering.  It is time to reorder the intellectual property
system as a whole.
The very demand of intellectual property owners for the circumven-
tion of publicly ordered restrictions should raise questions in the eyes of
the public.  As a result, the public should consider whether—in light of
the current methods of protection being used—Congress should reevalu-
ate the current intellectual property system.  In fields where technology
protection is shifting from public ordering to private ordering, it seems
clear that to better protect the public, Congress needs to reexamine its
intellectual property legislation and the courts need to reexamine their
interpretation of such legislation.
vaccine while also ensuring that individuals at all income levels will be able to af-
ford immunization.”); Clive Thompson, If You Liked This, You’re Sure to Love That,
N.Y. TIMES MAG. (Nov. 21, 2008), https://www.nytimes.com/2008/11/23/maga-
zine/23Netflix-t.html [https://perma.cc/H8KW-H25D] (“Netflix, the Web-based
DVD-rental company, was holding a contest to try to improve Cinematch, its ‘rec-
ommendation engine.’  The prize: $1 million.”).
3. One such example is the temporal limitation build into patent law, limiting
its protection to a term of 20 years from the date on which the patent application
was filed.  35 U.S.C. § 154 (a)(2) (2018).  Trademark and copyright laws bear their
own limitations.
4. See id. § 271.
5. But see, e.g., Thomas & Betts Corp. v. Panduit Corp., 138 F.3d 277, 286 (7th
Cir. 1998) (citing Scott Paper Co. v. Marcalus Mfg. Co., 326 U.S. 249, 256 (1945)).
4
Submission to Villanova Law Review
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr
2021] BARGAINING FOR INNOVATION 123
Software provides an excellent example of the difficulties in protect-
ing emerging technology.  Historically, software was difficult to protect
and easy to copy.6  At first, neither the patent system nor the copyright
system provided sufficient incentives for innovation, and programmers
turned to licenses to protect their investment in research and develop-
ment.  Congress listened, as did the courts, and public protection ex-
panded to cover software.  Developers flocked to take advantage of this
protection.  As a direct result of that boom, Congress and the courts in-
creased their interest in protecting software.  That increase resulted in ad-
ditional restrictions being placed on the patent protection available to
software.  In response to those restrictions, innovators returned to the era
of relying on private ordering instead of public ordering to protect
software—leading at least one commentator to note that the licenses to
the trademarks protecting software brands may be more valuable than the
software itself.7  There are many obstacles raised by today’s patent system
to a software innovator.  At the United States Patent and Trademark Of-
fice (PTO), the innovator seeking to patent an intangible invention must
prove that their innovation is not abstract.  A suit for patent infringement
on a method is held to a different standard than a suit for patent infringe-
ment on a system.8  At the United States International Trade Commission
(ITC), the physical form of the technology matters.  For example, e-read-
ers holding data, but not the data the e-reader downloads, can be ex-
cluded from importation into the United States.  The legislative
restrictions need to be reexamined to determine that the intent of protect-
ing the public interest is not defined by the strict limitations placed
therein.  Licenses protecting technology that crosses domestic boundaries
supplement public ordering and do not necessarily undermine the public
interest.  When those licenses, however, are used to circumvent the restric-
tions enacted by Congress on domestic trade, then the public must ask if
such licenses should be enforced.
The modern intellectual property market has shifted from a market
focused on sales to a market focused on licenses, eroding the public inter-
est in a way that we have yet to fully understand.  Consider the example of
the humble apple.  Part of American folklore, legend, and dietary choices
6. See generally Softman Prods. Co. v. Adobe Sys., Inc., 171 F. Supp. 2d 1075
(C.D. Cal. 2001); Ronald J. Mann, Do Patents Facilitate Financing in the Software Indus-
try?, 83 TEX. L. REV. 961 (2005).
7. See HEATHER J. MEEKER, THE OPEN SOURCE ALTERNATIVE: UNDERSTANDING
RISK AND LEVERAGING OPPORTUNITIES 114 (2008) (“The day may come when those
who determine the official versions of large open source projects like Linux will
control some of the most valuable pieces of intellectual property in the world: the
name by which the project is known.  While many in the open source world are
poised for a patent fight, trademark fights may be far more complicated and de-
structive.  Patents are a threat from outside the open source community.  Trade-
mark disputes are a lurking threat from within.”).
8. See generally Timothy R. Holbrook, Method Patent Exceptionalism, 102 IOWA L.
REV. 1001 (2017).
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for centuries, by the year 2000 the apple had devolved to a commodity
identified simply by its color—be it red, green, or gold.9  Stepping into a
grocery store today, the consumer is faced with a dazzling array of apple
choices.10  Dozens of varieties and brands are for sale, including Pink Lady
apples, First Kiss apples, Honeycrisp apples, and Cosmic Crisp apples.11
Purchasing an apple today is a different consumer experience than the
purchasing one in 2000.  That experience is shaped not by changes in
public ordering, but by private ordering, even though apples receive the
benefit of protection under the utility patent system, the plant patent sys-
tem, the Plant Variety Protection Act (PVPA), and trademark laws.12  De-
velopers are supplementing that set of rights with licenses designed to
protect both the consumer and the developer.  On the one hand, con-
tracts allow developers to protect the apple itself, by placing restrictions on
how the apple can be grown and distributed.  On the other hand, how-
ever, developers are using licenses to control access to the apples and
charge designer prices for designer apples.  This fundamental shift in the
way America’s first fruit is sold would not have been possible without the
paired protection of private and public ordering.
Changing public ordering is expensive, complicated, and, often, inef-
fective.13  The innate freedom to contract provides many opportunities for
innovation in private ordering.  In the best of both worlds, private order-
ing and innovation lead to changes in the intellectual property system,
strengthen public ordering, and render private ordering unnecessary.14
That ideal, however, does not often occur, and when market demand sub-
sumes public ordering, innovators seek protection by grafting private pro-
tection onto public protection.  Such contracts must be closely examined
to determine whether the restrictions envisioned by the courts and Con-
9. Tim Hensley, A Curious Tale: The Apple in North America, BROOKLYN BOTANIC
GARDENS (June 2, 2005), https://www.bbg.org/gardening/article/the_apple_in_
north_america [https://perma.cc/LQU6-H6XW] (“Grocery stores often stock
only one red, one green, and one yellow variety, which usually means ‘Red Deli-
cious,’ ‘Golden Delicious,’ and ‘Granny Smith.’”).
10. Paul J. Heald & Susannah Chapman, Veggie Tales: Pernicious Myths About
Patents, Innovation, and Crop Diversity in the Twentieth Century, 2012 U. ILL. L. REV.
1051, 1102 (“Our data show varietal diversity actually increased during the twenti-
eth century.”).
11. See ROWAN JACOBSEN, APPLES OF UNCOMMON CHARACTER: 123 HEIRLOOMS,
MODERN CLASSICS, & LITTLE-KNOWN WONDERS 61 (2014) [hereinafter JACOBSEN, AP-
PLES OF UNCOMMON CHARACTER]; Rowan Jacobsen, Why Your Supermarket Only Sells 5
Kinds of Apples, MOTHERJONES (Apr. 2013) [hereinafter Jacobsen, Why Your Super-
market Only Sells 5 Kinds of Apples], https://www.motherjones.com/environment/
2013/04/heritage-apples-john-bunker-maine [https://perma.cc/9M4S-8LMK].
12. See generally Heald & Chapman, supra note 10.
13. See, e.g., Joe Matal, A Guide to the Legislative History of the America Invents Act:
Part I of II, 21 FED. CIR. B.J. 435 (2011); Joe Matal, A Guide to the Legislative History of
the America Invents Act: Part II of II, 21 FED. CIR. B.J. 539 (2012).
14. See, e.g., 35 U.S.C. § 271(f) (2018) (addressing and identifying loophole
from Supreme Court’s decision in Deepsouth Packing v. Laitram Corp., 406 U.S. 518
(1972)).
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gress in enacting and enforcing legislation are being supplanted or sup-
plemented.  When licenses circumvent those restrictions, such licenses
violate public policy and should be found unenforceable.15
Answering the questions outlined in this Article will help the legisla-
ture determine where the market is broken and where a legislative fix
needs to be sought before the public’s interest is completely subsumed in
light of the innovator’s interest.  To begin to understand where to focus
the legislative correction, a few questions need to be asked.  First, is there
market demand?  Second, is there publicly ordered protection designed to
promote innovation in the field in question?  Third, are innovators in that
field using private ordering to promote innovation?  Fourth, is the private
ordering circumventing or augmenting the publicly ordered protection?
Fifth, why did Congress codify the protection?
In his seminal work, Imperfect Alternatives: Choosing Institutions in Law,
Economics, and Public Policy, Professor Komesar takes a deep dive into the
question of institutional choice.16  Institutional choice plays a key role in
papers written by Mark Lemley,17 Margaret Radin, Polk Wagner,18 and
Paul Gugliazza,19 among other distinguished intellectual property schol-
ars.  That being said, the question of what the relationship between institu-
tional choice and intellectual property norms should be remains yet
unanswered.  Today, the shift from public to private ordering is well un-
derway, if not already entrenched, and yet, there is little literature evaluat-
ing how to best protect the public interest in light of the imperfect
alternatives provided by Congress, the courts, and the law of contract.
Innovation thrives through incentivization.  Incentives arise from
market demand, public ordering, and private ordering.  Public ordering
represents a bargain between the public and the innovator—granting the
innovator rights while enforcing restrictions that favor the public.  Li-
censes that circumvent legislative restrictions violate public policy and
ought to be found unenforceable.  Part I of this Article uses the apple to
explore the evolution of intellectual property protection from an era
where it was kept under lock and key to the modern-day grafting of public
and private ordering.  Part II addresses the incentives presented by private
ordering, exploring its impact on the public’s interest.  The publicly or-
dered set of rights available to innovators within the United States is di-
verse, broad in scope, and protective of the public’s interest.  Licenses and
15. See generally Elizabeth Winston, Why Sell What You Can License? Contracting
Around Statutory Protection of Intellectual Property, 14 GEO. MASON L. REV. 93 (2006).
16. See generally NEIL K. KOMESAR, IMPERFECT ALTERNATIVES: CHOOSING INSTITU-
TIONS IN LAW, ECONOMICS, AND PUBLIC POLICY (1994).
17. Mark A. Lemley, The Law and Economics of Internet Norms, 73 CHI. KENT L.
REV. 1257 (1998).
18. Margaret Jane Radin & R. Polk Wagner, The Myth of Private Ordering: Redis-
covering Legal Realism in Cyberspace, 73 CHI. KENT L. REV. 1295 (1998).
19. Paul Gugliuzza, Patent Litigation Reform: The Courts, Congress, and the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, 95 B.U. L. REV. 279 (2015).
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non-disclosure agreements may supplement public ordering or supplant
it.  When private ordering extinguishes the carefully regulated restrictions
placed on public ordering, enforcement of the privately ordered set of
rights is not in the public interest.  Part III calls for a careful reevaluation
of the choice of institutions used to regulate public and private ordering,
demanding a deeper look into how licenses need to be limited, clarity
codified, and the rights of innovators and the public delineated.
The golden age of licensing is here.  Bargaining for innovation is re-
placing lobbying for legislative protection.  The concerns facing consum-
ers, innovators, competitors, and the very intellectual property system
itself are multifaceted, fundamental, and expansive.  When Congress and
the courts envision, enact, and enforce publicly ordering protections for
intellectual property, those protections are limited in scope.  Circum-
venting those restrictions through contract is unconscionable.  It is time to
take a closer look at licenses and innovation.  When such licenses betray
the bargain struck by Congress and the courts, private ordering should not
be upheld. In fields where private ordering is the primary form of protec-
tion, public ordering needs to be closely examined to determine how to
better protect the needs of the innovators and the public.
I. PROTECTING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
Consuming an apple in 1905 was a different experience than it is to-
day.  The Nomenclature of the Apple: A Catalogue of Known Varieties Listed in
American Publications from 1804-1904, listed over 17,000 different apple
names.20  A century later, consumers purchased apples primarily by
color—red, green, or gold.21  Today, consumers ask for apples by name—
20. W. H. RAGAN, NOMENCLATURE OF THE APPLE: A CATALOGUE OF KNOWN VA-
RIETIES LISTED IN AMERICAN PUBLICATIONS FROM 1804–1904, in U.S DEP’T OF AGRIC.,
BUREAU OF PLANT INDUSTRY BULLETIN No. 56 (1905).  Heald & Chapman, supra
note 10, at 1065 (suggesting that despite this large number, only between 280–420
apple varieties were actually commercially available in that time period).
21. JACOBSEN, APPLES OF UNCOMMON CHARACTER, supra note 11, at 61 (“Even
in the 1990s, the typical American supermarket would have three apples: green
Granny Smith, yellow Golden Delicious, and red Red Delicious.  One for cooking,
one for fresh eating, and one for staring at from afar.”); see Hensley, supra note 9
(“Grocery stores often stock only one red, one green, and one yellow variety, which
usually means ‘Red Delicious’, ‘Golden Delicious’, and ‘Granny Smith.’”).
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purchasing Fuji,22 Pink Lady,23 Jazz,24 and McIntosh25 apples, among
other types.26  In 1905, apples came in all shapes, sizes, and colors.27  By
2013, grocery stores dictated the exact size, coloration, and appearance of
the apples.28  Granny Smith found a chance seedling in her backyard in
1868, and she liked the apple so much that she began propagating it.29
Every Granny Smith apple eaten today is the genetic clone of that chance
seedling.30  The modern apple is branded, managed, and carefully culti-
22. The Fuji apple was first developed in Japan in the 1930s. See Joseph
Mercola, Great Expectations: The Rise—and Fall—of the (Once) Red Delicious Apple,
MERCOLA (Feb. 20, 2016), https://articles.mercola.com/sites/articles/archive/
2016/02/20/red-delicious-apples.aspx [https://perma.cc/WC4Y-KR7C].  It was a
direct descendent of an apple grown by Thomas Jefferson in Virginia, who has
been described as its grandfather.  Hensley, supra note 9.
23. The Pink Lady was introduced to the market in 1989. JOAN MORGAN &
ALISON RICHARDS, THE NEW BOOK OF APPLES: THE DEFINITIVE GUIDE TO APPLES IN-
CLUDING OVER 2,000 VARIETIES 252 (2002).
24. The Jazz apple was introduced to the American market in 2017. See NZ-
Grown Jazz Apples Arrive in U.S. with New Branding, FRESHFRUITPORTAL.COM (May 11,
2017), https://www.freshfruitportal.com/news/2017/05/11/u-s-nz-grown-jazz-ap-
ples-arrive-u-s-new-branding/ [https://perma.cc/GK9M-Z4UF].
25. The McIntosh is an older apple, found in 1811, and commercially grown
by the early 1900s. MORGAN & RICHARDS, supra note 23.
26. See Olivia Miltner, New Wave Varieties Upset the Apple Cart, OZY (Dec. 6,
2018), https://www.ozy.com/the-new-and-the-next/new-wave-varieties-upset-the-
apple-cart/90620/ [https://perma.cc/K9NQ-6R8C] (“At the turn of the century,
supermarkets globally had access to 150 apple varieties in all.  Today, that number
is 217, up 45 percent.  In the last seven years, 25 new varieties have hit stores, 11 of
them from the U.S.  Once launched, these new apple brands take off quickly.”);
Janet van Zoeren & Amaya Atucha, The Rise of Apple Clubs and Trademark Varieties of
Fruit, WISCONTEXT (Nov. 3, 2016, 3:00 PM), https://www.wiscontext.org/rise-ap-
ple-clubs-and-trademark-varieties-fruit [https://perma.cc/7EXT-2QPT] (“Apples
are one of the few produce items marketed by cultivar name—consumers will pay
more for particular varieties that offer[ ] better taste, color and flavor.”).
27. See ANDREW MIKOLAJSKI, THE COMPLETE WORLD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF APPLES:
A COMPREHENSIVE IDENTIFICATION GUIDE TO OVER 400 VARIETIES ACCOMPANIED BY
90 SCRUMPTIOUS RECIPES 15 (2017) (noting that today there are over 8,000 apple
varieties, of which only 100 or so are commercially grown, while “ten varieties
mak[e] up 90 percent of production”); Hensley, supra note 9 (“[I]n the 19th cen-
tury, apples came in all shapes and guises, some with rough, sandpapery skin,
others as misshapen as potatoes, and ranging from the size of a cherry to bigger
than a grapefruit.  Colors ran the entire spectrum with a wonderful impressionistic
array of patterning—flushes, stripes, splashes, and dots.”).
28. See, e.g., Lindsey Smith, This Isn’t Your Granny Smith’s Harvesting Technology,
NPR: THE SALT (Oct. 14, 2013, 2:36 PM), https://www.npr.org/transcripts/
232235993?storyId=232235993?storyId=232235993 [https://perma.cc/7HLT-
YAMD].
29. See, e.g., Mick Telkamp, Granny Smith Apples: A Brief History of the Iconic
Fruit, HGTV https://www.hgtv.com/outdoors/flowers-and-plants/fruit/granny-
smith-apples [https://perma.cc/UX75-P7KV] (last visited Jan. 31, 2021) (explain-
ing that the Granny Smith apples began as “a chance seedling discovered [in 1868]
growing from a pile of discarded crab apples somewhere near Sydney, Australia”).
30. See, e.g., Mary Jane DuFord, Granny Smith Apples: An All-Round Old Favourite
Tart Baking Apple Variety, HOME FOR HARVEST, https://www.homefortheharvest.
com/granny-smith-apples/ [https://perma.cc/F23N-G94M] (last visited Feb. 24,
9
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vated.  Technology in 1905 was not protected by the same vast network of
private and public ordering that we see in 2020.  The apple orchard is a
continually evolving and incredibly profitable market driven by the part-
nership between public and private ordering.31  The changes in the apple
consumed in 1905 and the apple acquired in 2020 provide a lens to view
the changes through in public and private ordering.
Intellectual property owners enjoy a bountiful set of domestic rights.
The system of rewards for innovation encompasses utility patents, plant
patents, plant variety protection certificates, design patents, copyright re-
gistration, and trademarks, among other forms of publicly legislated pro-
tection.  There is a substantial public interest in promoting disclosure of
novel ideas and promulgating public ordering.  Thus, public ordering al-
lows for the promotion of innovation and the public interest at the same
time within the apple market.
Tom Burford, renowned heirloom apple expert, famously described
today’s apple as a sad supermarket fruit, known to most Americans only by
its appearance and ability to last in a tabletop fruit bowl.32  Such an apple,
according to Burford, lacks the provenance and flavor of heritage vari-
eties.33  One apple, for instance—the Harrison—was popular in the nine-
teenth century and was long thought lost.34  When the Harrison was
rediscovered, it turned out to be a “superior cider variety” which helped
revitalize the cider industry as a whole.35  Its loss came about because of
changes in apple consumers’ demand.36  Its modern success is driven in
part by domestic interest in artisan cider making, the championship of
2021) (“Every Granny Smith apple today is grown on a tree where the wood has
been grafted from the original tree in Australia (or more likely, the graft of a graft
of a graft).”); Jacobsen, Why Your Supermarket Only Sells 5 Kinds of Apples, supra note
11 (“If you like the apples made by a particular tree, and you want to make more
trees just like it, you have to clone it: Snip off a shoot from the original tree, graft it
onto a living rootstock, and let it grow.  This is how apple varieties come into exis-
tence.  Every McIntosh is a graft of the original tree that John McIntosh discovered
on his Ontario farm in 1811, or a graft of a graft.  Every Granny Smith stems from
the chance seedling spotted by Maria Ann Smith in her Australian compost pile in
the mid-1800s.”).
31. See MIKOLAJSKI, supra note 27.
32. See Adrian Higgins, Tom Burford, Champion of the Heirloom Apple, Dies at 84,





34. Fran McManus, Lost & Found: The Search for the Harrison Apple, EDIBLE
JERSEY (Sept. 1, 2010), https://ediblejersey.ediblecommunities.com/food-thought
/lost-found-search-harrison-apple [https://perma.cc/W5GW-NBK6].
35. Higgins, supra note 32.
36. McManus, supra note 34 (discussing the impact of urbanization, prohibi-
tion, and consumer taste on this once popular apple variety); Timothy Egan, “Per-
fect” Apple Pushed Growers Into Debt, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 4, 2000), https://
www.nytimes.com/2000/11/04/us/perfect-apple-pushed-growers-into-debt.html
[https://perma.cc/VU5Q-2E56] (“The growers say they established color, size and
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apple experts such as Tom Burford, and the Harrison’s own distinctive
flavor.37  In 1992, “the apple crop’s annual nationwide commercial value
exceed[ed] $1 billion” dollars.38  By 2018, the domestic commercial value
was over $3.55 billion, the export value of apples is over $1 billion dollars,
and predictions had the domestic apple crop exceeding 256 million bush-
els.39  Market demand has played a fundamental role in promoting agri-
cultural innovation.40  Modern apples have catchy names41 and reside in a
landscape of trademarks, contracts, plant patents, international growing
consortiums, and multimillion-dollar marketing campaigns.42  The apple
orchard has proven to be an incubator for innovation at the intersection
of public and private ordering.
A. Physical Protection of Intellectual Property
Marketing has long played an essential role in the image of the apple.
Dating back to Johnny Appleseed, who is more marketing myth than prac-
tical apple purveyor, and moving forward to today, the apple is as Ameri-
can as its myths and legends.43  In the late 1870s, an Iowan farmer planted
firmness standards in response to the major supermarket chains, who wanted a
consistent product that caught the eye of the harried shopper.”).
37. Id.
38. Pat Bailey, First Field Trial of Transgenic Apples Begins, U.C. DAVIS (Apr. 15,
1992), https://www.ucdavis.edu/news/first-field-trial-transgenic-apples-begins/
[https://perma.cc/2RCT-BF5E].
39. Ross Courtney, 2018 Apple Harvest by the Numbers: Industry Looks into Crystal
Ball for 2018 Forecast Around the Globe, GOOD FRUIT GROWER (Oct. 2, 2018), https://
www.goodfruit.com/harvest-by-the-numbers/ [https://perma.cc/2CUL-9TPB].
40. Dan Charles, Want to Grow These Apples? You’ll Have to Join the Club, MINN.
PUB. RADIO NEWS (Nov. 10, 2014, 10:11 PM), https://www.mprnews.org/story/
2014/11/10/npr-new-apples [https://perma.cc/97LD-3W7N] (“There’s an apple
renaissance underway, an ever-expanding array of colors and tastes in the apple
section of supermarkets and farmers markets.  Less visible is the economic machin-
ery that’s helping to drive this revolution.  An increasing number of these new
apples are ‘club apples’—varieties that are not just patented, but also trademarked
and controlled in such a way that only a select ‘club’ of farmers can sell them.”).
41. Amy Sowder, What’s in a Name?  A Lot, When It Comes to 2019 Apples, PACKER
(Jan. 11, 2019), https://www.thepacker.com/markets/marketing-markets/ship-
ping/whats-name-lot-when-it-comes-2019-apples [permalink unavailable] (“The
names of apples influence the consumer.  They speak to each apple . . . .”).
42. Brooke Jarvis, The Launch, CAL. SUNDAY MAG. (July 18, 2019), https://
story.californiasunday.com/cosmic-crisp-apple-launch [https://perma.cc/68GF-
MK3S].
43. Johnny Appleseed was, in fact, a real person, born in Massachusetts with
the given name of John Chapman.  However, the apples that Johnny Appleseed
planted were not eating apples, but were, rather, apples used to make hard cider.
See Dawn Mitchell, The Truth About Johnny Appleseed and Hard Cider, INDYSTAR,
https://www.indystar.com/story/news/history/retroindy/2018/10/25/truth-
johnny-appleseed-and-hard-cider-indiana-history/1670562002/ [https://
perma.cc/FY5A-488Z] (last updated Oct. 25, 2018, 4:03 PM).  There is no mention
of this in the seminal work establishing Johnny Appleseed’s legend—William
D’Arcy Haley’s article, Johnny Appleseed.  A Pioneer Hero—which was published in
Harper’s Magazine in November of 1871.  Instead, that article focuses on the fact
11
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apple seedlings on his farm.44  From those seedlings, a mutant apple tree
grew that produced “the best tasting apple in the whole world.”45  Known
as the Hawkeye, this apple won a national taste test and was purchased by a
Louisiana nursery that aggressively marketed it as the Red Delicious.46
That mutant tree went on to produce the number one, best-selling apple
in America for the next seventy years, comprising over 90% of the apple
crop grown in the United States at one point.47  When Clarence Stark
purchased the original tree that produced the Golden Delicious apple in
1914, he sought to prevent theft of his property.48  Stark surrounded the
original apple tree with a locked and alarmed steel cage, to prevent any
cuttings from being taken from the tree.49
This physical protection was important because apples are genetic hy-
brids.50 Apples have seeds, true, but if the seed of an apple is planted, the
seed will not breed true, and the apples grown on the tree from that seed
will bear no more than a “glancing resemblance to the original apple.”51
To reproduce a true copy of the desired apple, farmers use an asexual
method of reproduction called grafting.52  Propagation through grafting
involves taking a cutting from the parent apple tree and physically attach-
ing that cutting to existing rootstock.53  The buds on the “sticks” cut from
the original tree each have the potential of propagating the desired apple,
that Johnny Appleseed’s whole life was “devoted to the work of planting apple
seeds in remote places.”  William D’Arcy Haley, Johnny Appleseed.  A Pioneer Hero,
HARPER’S MAG. (Nov. 1871), https://harpers.org/archive/1871/11/johnny-apple-
seed-a-pioneer-hero/ [https://perma.cc/3GTY-UZYF].
44. Mercola, supra note 22.
45. Id.
46. Id.; Sarah Yager, The Awful Reign of the Red Delicious: How the Worst Apple
Took Over the United States, and Continues to Spread, ATLANTIC (Sept. 10, 2014),
https://www.theatlantic.com/health/archive/2014/09/the-evil-reign-of-the-red-
delicious/379892/ [https://perma.cc/7HUR-V9SW].
47. Jeanette Hurt, This Is Why Red Delicious Apples Suck So Hard, HUFFINGTON
POST (Aug. 22, 2018, 5:46 AM), https://www.huffpost.com/entry/red-delicious-ap-
ples-suck_n_5b630199e4b0b15abaa061af [https://perma.cc/Z2N5-KPEE]; Sanam
Yar, Your Fall Apple Options May Look a Little Different This Year, BUSTLE (Sept. 4,
2018), https://www.bustle.com/p/red-delicious-apples-are-no-longer-americas-
top-produced-apple-just-in-time-for-fall-11492564 [https://perma.cc/2V59-APZP].
48. Daniel Neman, Stark Bro’s Bicentennial—Red and Golden Delicious Apple Pio-





50. MICHAEL POLLAN, THE BOTANY OF DESIRE: A PLANT’S-EYE VIEW OF THE
WORLD 10 (2001).
51. Id.
52. See, e.g., Delano Farms Co. v. Cal. Table Grape Comm’n, No. 1:07-CV-
01610-SEH, 2013 WL 5146910, at *3 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 12, 2013) (discussing grafting
in the context of growing grapes), aff’d, 778 F.3d 1243 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
53. Id.
12
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which will be the genetic twin of the parent apple.54  Clarence Stark’s
physical protection of the apple tree, in an era when plants had no intel-
lectual property protection, allowed him to control access to the cuttings
from the tree, thus preventing others from making genetically identical
copies of his “Golden Delicious” apple.55  He was, in essence, using private
ordering to protect his intellectual property.
Apple innovation’s physical aspects has centralized apple research to-
day.  In the United States, the University of Minnesota, Cornell University,
and Washington State University develop the vast majority of new apple
varieties.56  Developing a new apple variety is a time-consuming process—
taking over a decade, at a minimum, to move from the idea stage to the
consumer’s diet.57  The idea must be promulgated, the apple trees must
be hand-pollinated to develop the perfect cross, the best regions to grow
the apple must be researched, and finally, the name and method of distri-
bution and control must be determined.58  Market demand has incen-
tivized an aggressive and effective protection scheme combining private
ordering, public ordering, and physical control.  One cannot take an ap-
ple tree to the local shop and make a simple and straightforward copy of
the intellectual property embodied therein.  That inherent physical pro-
tection allows growers to protect their market effectively through private
ordering.  Such protection is inherently limited, however, by the remedies
available for breach of that protection.
B. Plant Patent Act
In 1930, Congress enacted the first public law protecting agricultural
innovation in the United States.  The Plant Patent Act (PPA) granted pro-
tection to new asexually reproducing plants, which cannot self-replicate.59
The PPA grants patentees the right to exclude others from asexually re-
producing, using, offering for sale, selling, or importing the patented
plant within the United States.60  This right, however, is granted to a nar-
row range of plants, and the plants covered are the very plants least in
need of legal protection because they are protected by their own asexually
54. See id.
55. Clarence Stark could not prevent a competitor from coming up with the
identical genetic version of the Golden Delicious by creating the exact same cross-
pollination—but it would be highly unlikely that a competitor could do so—even
today.
56. See Alex Abad-Santos, Honeycrisp Was Just the Beginning: Inside the Quest to
Create the Perfect Apple, VOX, https://www.vox.com/culture/2016/10/6/13078268/
honeycrisp-apple-explainer-club-apples [permalink unavailable] (last updated
Sept. 11, 2017, 10:23 AM).
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. For more on the historical reasons for this distinction, see J.E.M. Ag Supply
Inc. v Pioneer Hi-Bred Int’l, Inc., 534 U.S. 124, 132 (2001).
60. 35 U.S.C. § 163 (2018).
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reproducing nature—in other words, they do not self-replicate.61  Plant
patents protect the plant, and not its seeds, fruit, or cellular material.62  A
plant patent is limited to one variety and its asexual progeny, and does not
cover a mutant or a sport.63  The nature of asexual reproduction is such
that the purchase of a single asexually reproduced plant can result in
many years of crops.64  Authorized purchasers of asexually reproduced
plants, under the PPA, have the right to develop new and distinct varieties
through cross-pollination, for instance, as long as the purchaser does not
clone the purchased plant in violation of the PPA.65  Those new varieties
may be patented as well if they meet the PPA requirements.66  In other
words, PPA protection is quite narrow.
However, as narrow as such protection is, that publicly ordered pro-
tection remains valuable—balancing out the public interest with the rights
given to the innovator.67  As discussed, apple trees do not breed true, and
a farmer who plants an apple orchard with seeds from a particular apple
variety would not grow trees producing that variety.68  The farmer would
instead end up with trees reflecting the genetic diversity of all modern
apple varieties.69  This diversity is reflected in the fact that many plant
patents have been granted to apple varieties.70
61. In 2018, there were 595,683 utility patent applications filed at the PTO,
and only 1,058 plant patent applications. U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, PER-
FORMANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY REPORT 178 tbl.1 (2018), https://www.uspto.gov/
sites/default/files/documents/USPTOFY18PAR.pdf [https://perma.cc/92UK-
3KH2].
62. See, e.g., In re Arzberger, 112 F.2d 834 (C.C.P.A. 1940).
63. See, e.g., Imazio Nursery, Inc. v. Dania Greenhouses, 69 F.3d 1560, 1568
(Fed. Cir. 1995) (discussing the difference between plant variety as used in the
PVPA and the PPA and holding that “the scope of a plant patent is the asexual
progeny of the patented plant variety”).
64. Carla R. D. Bourne, Will § 101 Patents Have Utility for Plants?, 3 SAN JOA-
QUIN AGRIC. L. REV. 155, 159 (1993) (“Crops produced by asexually reproduced
plants (for example apples, grapes, and oranges) generate crops for many years as
opposed to crops from sexually reproduced plants (for example wheat, soybeans,
and rice) which require new seed for each crop.”); TOM BURFORD, APPLES OF
NORTH AMERICA: 192 EXCEPTIONAL VARIETIES FOR GARDENERS, GROWERS, AND
COOKS 218 (2013) (“[A]pple trees will often fruit for fifty years or more.”).
65. 35 U.S.C. § 163 (“In the case of a plant patent, the grant shall include the
right to exclude others from asexually reproducing the plant.”).
66. See, e.g., Imazio Nursery, 69 F.3d at 1565 (“[A] patentable variety could be
either a sport, mutant, or hybrid.”).
67. See Heald & Chapman, supra note 10, at 1079 (“As of 2009, 372 apple
varieties have been subject to patents.”).
68. Apples are heterozygous.  Every apple seed will produce a different apple
than the apple that grew the seed in the first place. See POLLAN, supra note 50, at
10.
69. Id.
70. See, e.g., Apple, U.S. Plant Patent No. 61 (issued Apr. 18, 1933) (“What is
claimed is: An apple substantially as herein shown and described . . . .”).
14
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On March 20, 1990, the University of Minnesota received Plant Patent
7197 for the Honeycrisp variety apple tree.71  The plant patent on the
Honeycrisp and its foreign sales rights has “earned the University of Min-
nesota more than ten million dollars in royalties, making it the third-most-
valuable invention ever produced there.”72  Known derisively as the
“Moneycrisp” apple, the variety has grown in its success, market demand
has kept up with the higher prices, and despite its higher costs, the
Honeycrisp apple is one of the most popular apple varieties sold in the
United States.73  Its success came about, in part, because of the robust,
publicly ordered protections available for plants.  Gala apples, first pat-
ented in 1974, have a distinctive, mottled skin color, leading to a high
propensity to produce sports with different skin color mutations.74  As a
result, over twenty sports of Gala apples have been cultivated and pat-
ented.75  Each of these sports can be reproduced without a license from
the owner of the plant patent on the original Gala apple.76  Despite these
limitations, plant patents remain a valuable source of public ordering for
the promotion of disclosure and innovation.77  The first plant patent was
71. Apple Tree: Honeycrisp, U.S. Plant Patent No. 7197 (issued Mar. 20,
1990).
72. John Seabrook, Crunch: Building a Better Apple, NEW YORKER (Nov. 14,
2011), https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2011/11/21/crunch [https://
perma.cc/NHA7-LF6Y].
73. Claudine Ko, Is the Honeycrisp Apple Engineered to Fail?, WIRED, https://
www.wired.com/brandlab/2016/05/is-the-honeycrisp-apple-engineered-to-fail/
[https://perma.cc/KMH2-KU6B] (last visited Jan. 31, 2021) (“The Honeycrisp is
now the most planted variety in Washington State, the country’s biggest apple
producer.”).
74. See Apple Tree, U.S. Plant Patent No. 3,637 (issued Oct. 15, 1974).
75. Sport of Gala Patents (Class PLT/162), JUSTIA: PATENTS, https://pat-
ents.justia.com/patents-by-us-classification/PLT/162?page=2 [https://perma.cc/
2G2V-RX4K] (last visited Dec. 15, 2020).
76. Bourne, supra note 64.
77. See OFFICE OF TECH. ASSESSMENT, OTA-BA-370, NEW DEVELOPMENTS IN BIO-
TECHNOLOGY: PATENTING LIFE—SPECIAL REPORT, CHAPTER 5: INTELLECTUAL PROP-
ERTY AND PLANTS 69–90 (Apr. 1989) (noting that the Plant Patent Act “was
designed to encourage new variety development and to afford agriculture the ben-
efits of the patent system”); John King & Paul Heisey, Ag Biotech Patents: Who Is
Doing What?, AMBER WAVES MAG. (Nov. 1, 2003), https://www.ers.usda.gov/amber-
waves/2003/november/ag-biotech-patents-who-is-doing-what/ [https://perma.cc/
ZN9L-V3BV] (“The upward trend in ag biotech patents has outpaced the overall
upward trend in patenting throughout the U.S. economy.  This trend reflects in-
creased research and development, changing legal doctrine on what can be pat-
ented, and different strategic uses of intellectual property protection.”).
15
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issued in 1931,78 and today, over 30,000 plant patents have been issued.79
Litigation over plant patent infringement is rare.80
C. Plant Variety Protection Act
Horticulturists pushed for additional protection for sexually repro-
ducing plants.81  Such plants are much more difficult to protect because a
primary purpose of the plant is to genetically reproduce itself.  As a result,
in 1970 Congress passed the Plant Variety Protection Act (PVPA), granting
limited protection for plant varieties through the issuance of Certificates
of Protection (PVP certificates).82  The 2018 Farm Bill expanded the pro-
tection of the PVPA to asexually reproducing plants.83  A PVP certificate
allows its holder the exclusive right to market the specific, novel, distinct,
uniform, and stable seed variety for a period of time.84  On average, 480
applications for PVP certificates are filed annually, with an average issu-
ance time of eighteen months.85
To introduce innovation into the seed market, a seed firm must first
develop parent seed lines86 that are the core of the company.87  Seed
78. See Climbing or Trailing Rose, U.S. Plant Patent No. 1 (issued Aug. 18,
1931).
79. See Table of Issue Years and Patent Numbers, for Selected Document Types Issued
Since 1836, U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF., https://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/ac/
ido/oeip/taf/issuyear.htm [https://perma.cc/7N87-G6CE] (last modified Feb.
12, 2021, 7:34 AM).
80. See, e.g., Robert J. Jondle, U.S. Plant Patents and the Imazio Decision, JONDLE
& ASSOCIATES P.C., https://ipmall.law.unh.edu/sites/default/files/hosted_re
sources/PLANT_PATENT_ARTICLES/Robert_Jondle_-_US_Plant_Patents_and_
the_Imazio_Decision.pdf [https://perma.cc/8VJK-7E6Z] (last visited Dec. 16,
2020) (relying on a survey of U.S. flower companies, Mr. Jondle found that plant
patents are “well respected” and that “[h]aving a Plant Patent increases the royalty
paid by licensee” as much as five or ten times and that litigation is rare simply
because the system “is working well”).
81. See Cary Fowler, The Plant Patent Act of 1930: A Sociological History of its
Creation, 82 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 621, 630–31 (2000).
82. The Plant Variety Protection Office (PVPO), which administers the PVPA,
has examined over 180 species of plants, resulting in the issuance of almost 14,000
PVP certificates.  Plant Variety Protection Board, Plant Variety Protection Board Meet-
ing Minutes Chicago, Illinois—April 24— 26, 2019, U.S. DEP’T AGRIC. PLANT VARIETY
PROTECTION OFF., https://www.ams.usda.gov/sites/default/files/media/PVPO
April2019BoardMeetingMinutes.pdf [https://perma.cc/VXZ9-37FQ] (last visited
Jan. 31, 2021).
83. Agriculture Improvement Act of 2018 (Farm Bill), Pub. L. No. 115-334,
132 Stat. 4490 (2018).
84. 7 U.S.C. §§ 2402, 2483 (2018).
85. U.S. DEP’T AGRIC. PLANT VARIETY PROTECTION OFF., supra note 82.
86. See Mark D. Janis, Supplemental Forms of Intellectual Property Protection for
Plants, 6 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 305, 305 (2004) (“Trade secret protection has
long been used in the seed industry.”); id. at 308 (“[One example of] trade secret
protection that is considered to be typical in the seed industry: trade secrets in the
identity and genetics of the inbred parents of a commercially-distributed hybrid.”).
87. JORGE FERNANDEZ-CORNEJO, U.S. DEP’T AGRIC., INFO. BULLETIN NO. 786,
THE SEED INDUSTRY IN U.S. AGRICULTURE: AN EXPLORATION OF DATA AND INFORMA-
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firms often have several seed lines that are heavily protected through pub-
lic and private ordering.88  Farmers growing seed historically saved seed to
regrow the following year.89  The PVPA codified this practice and specifi-
cally exempted saved seed from the protections issued to the holder of a
PVP certificate.90  The saved-seed exception allows a farmer to purchase
seed once, reproduce the seed, save that seed, and use that saved seed to
replant the farmer’s fields.91  To circumvent this exception and reclaim
potentially lost profit, seed companies focused their energy on developing
seed that could not be saved—such as hybrid corn.92  This saved seed ex-
TION ON CROP SEED MARKETS, REGULATION, INDUSTRY STRUCTURE, AND RESEARCH
AND DEVELOPMENT 28 (Jan. 2004) (“Plant breeding constitutes the foundation of
the modern seed industry in that it creates a unique and marketable product
through the application of science.  Plant breeders develop seeds embodying such
improvements as high yields, resistance to disease and pests, or traits specific to
regional agroclimatic conditions.  A seed’s success in the market depends prima-
rily on its improved traits, which embody the R&D effort.”), https://
www.ers.usda.gov/webdocs/publications/42517/13616_aib786_1_.pdf?v=9374.1
[https://perma.cc/PE7P-VRCW].
88. Michael T. Roberts, National Aglaw Center Research Article, J.E.M. Ag. Sup-
ply, Inc. v. Pioneer Hi-Bred International, Inc.: Its Meaning and Significance for the
Agricultural Community, 28 S. ILL. U. L.J. 91, 126 (2003) (“Until . . . the [US]PTO
reversed its stance on the issuance of utility patents for sexually reproducing
plants, seed companies typically employed trade secrets to protect the parental
line.  Trade secret protection still serves as a valuable tool in protecting the interest
of seed producers.”); see also FERNANDEZ-CORNEJO, supra note 87, at 28 (“The high
costs associated with large-scale R&D limit it to a relatively small number of large
companies and to Federal Government agencies and land-grant colleges and uni-
versities.  High R&D costs require private sector varieties to be commercially viable,
highly competitive, and well protected by intellectual property rights (IPR).”).
89. See Asgrow Seed Co. v. Winterboer, 989 F.2d 478, 480 (Fed. Cir. 1993)
(Newman, C.J.,  dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc) (“ The farmer’s ex-
emption permits farmers to continue their usual practice of saving part of their
crop as seed for replanting on their farms . . . .”); Asgrow Seed Co. v. Winterboer,
795 F. Supp. 915, 918 (N.D. Iowa 1991) (stating “Congress specifically protected
the historical and traditional right of small farmers like the Winterboers to make
seed sales to fellow farmers,” and noting the seed sold was saved seed), rev’d, 982
F.2d 486 (Fed. Cir. 1992), rev’d, 513 U.S. 179 (1995); Seedsaving and Seedsavers’ Re-
sources, FRIENDS OF THE GARDEN, http://homepage.tinet.ie/~merlyn/seedsav-
ing.html [https://perma.cc/JQ5D-ZUCP] (last visited Feb. 24, 2021).
90. See 7 U.S.C. §§ 2543–2544 (2018).
91. See id. § 2543; Asgrow Seed Co. v. Winterboer, 513 U.S. 179, 192 (1995).
92. JACK RALPH KLOPPENBURG, JR., FIRST THE SEED: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF
PLANT BIOTECHNOLOGY 11 (Daniel Lee Kleinman & Jo Handelsman eds., 2005)
(“[P]lant breeders have long pursued hybrids less for their superior agronomic
characteristics than for the ‘biological patent’ that they confer.  Given the key role
that cytoplasmic male sterility had played in the production of hybrids, researchers
were, by the early 1980s, already looking to use biotechnology for the induction of
sterility in specified generations of seed patents.  As understanding of gene struc-
ture and operation advanced during the 1990s, both corporate and public labs
explored the ways various functions of a plant—including its fertility—could be
switched on and off by application of various chemicals.”); see also FERNANDEZ-
CORNEJO, supra note 87, at vi (“Hybrid corn varieties developed in the first half of
the 20th century and, widely accepted by farmers, provided the private sector a
natural method of protecting plant breeding investments—saved hybrid corn seed
17
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ception is one of the most litigated aspects of the protection offered by the
PVPA.93
PVPA protection is routinely sought for novel varieties of seed.  It is
inexpensive to obtain and (unfortunately) also very limited in its scope of
protection.  Not a single PVP certificate has ever been held invalid by the
court system.94  That being said, PVP certificates provide significant pro-
tection for the public interest, promote mandatory disclosure, and contain
various research exceptions.  The exceptions are largely contracted
around, however, and the value of the PVP certificate may be more in
name than the number of PVPA applications might otherwise indicate.95
D. Utility Patent Protection
It was not until 1986 that the first utility patent was granted to a
plant.96  Fifteen years later, in 2001, the Supreme Court ruled in J.E.M. Ag
Supply Inc. v Pioneer Hi-Bred International, Inc.97 that seed was eligible for
both utility and plant patents.98  As strong as utility patent protection for
plant varieties seems, however, there are major limitations on the scope of
utility patents.  Natural phenomena, for instance, are not patent-eligible
subject matter.99
The seed at issue in J.E.M. was a non-genetically modified, hybrid
corn seed.100  Hybrid seed is the product of cross-fertilization of two par-
ent varieties.101  The seed was the result of extensive research and careful
produces substantially lower yields, encouraging farmers to repurchase seed every
year.”).
93. See generally Jim Chen, The Parable of the Seeds: Interpreting the Plant Variety
Protection Act in Furtherance of Innovation Policy, 81 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 105, 111
(2005)
94. See, e.g., Arizona Grain Inc. v. Barkley Ag Enterprises LLC, No. CV-18-
03371-PHX-GMS, 2019 WL 5801968, at *1 (D. Ariz. Nov. 7, 2019) (“At all times
relevant herein, the PVP Certificate for SY 158T was and remains in full force and
effect.”).
95. See, e.g., Monsanto v. Scruggs, 459 F.3d 1328, 1333 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (ex-
plaining Monsanto licenses seed to seed sellers with “certain restrictions on seed
sellers, including that seed companies may not sell seed containing Monsanto’s
technology to growers unless the grower signs one of Monsanto’s license agree-
ments; and that seed so sold may be used by growers to grow only a single commer-
cial crop”).
96. Claim 1 of U.S. Patent No. 4,581,847 (issued April 15, 1986) reads, “A
maize seed having an endogenous free tryptophan content of at least about one-
tenth milligram per gram dry seed weight and capable of germinating into a plant
capable of producing seed having an endogenous free tryptophan content of at
least about one-tenth milligram per grain dry seed weight.”  The ’847 patent was
the subject of Ex Parte Hibberd, 227 U.S.P.Q. 443 (B.P.A.I. Sept. 24, 1985).
97. 534 U.S. 124 (2001).
98. Id. at 145.
99. See Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66,
70–71 (2012).
100. See J.E.M., 534 U.S. at 127–28.
101. Id.
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cross-breeding, but it could, in theory, have been discovered in nature.102
When replanted, a hybrid seed will not breed true.103  As a result, if a
farmer wishes to grow a hybrid variety, that farmer must have access to new
hybrid seed each year.104  If the seed is a protected variety, then the
farmer must purchase the seed from a licensed source.  Now, if instead of
doing this, suppose that the same farmer planted in a field the two parent
varieties that, when crossed, create a patent-eligible seed corn variety.
Under natural conditions, some pollen will be windborne from each vari-
ety to fertilize the other variety.105  The farmer may, thus, find infringing
corn seed in the field.106  Should the patentee recover damages from the
farmer for the farmer’s failure to interfere with nature?  Remarkably,
there is no discussion of this question in J.E.M. and no other relevant case
law.107  To prove infringement of a plant patent, access to the patented
102. Hybrid seed corn is created when two species of corn are mated together
by fertilizing the flower of one species with the pollen of another species. Geneti-
cally Modified Foods, PBS, http://archive.pov.org/hybrid/genetically-modified-
foods/ [https://perma.cc/CY6M-RFQU] (last visited Jan. 31, 2021).  The USDA
reports the following:
The production of hybrid seed requires careful control of the parents.
During the experimental phases of developing inbred lines and hybrids,
this control is accomplished by covering the ear shoots and tassels with
bags and transferring pollen of the desired type by hand.  In commercial
seed production, control is achieved by the isolation of the seed fields
and by the removal of tassels, before shedding of the pollen begins, from
the rows to be used as female parents.
Agricultural Research Timeline: Improving Corn, U.S. DEP’T AGRIC., http://
www.ars.usda.gov/is/timeline/corn.htm [https://perma.cc/J74A-QBZW] (last up-
dated Feb. 14, 2018).  This is the only way to achieve uniformity in the variety.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Cross-pollination can occur through the transfer of windborne pollen
from one species to another.  Tripti Vashisth, Pollination Techniques, PLANT BREED-
ING 21ST CENTURY, http://plantbreeding.coe.uga.edu/index.php?title=19._Pollina
tion_Techniques [https://perma.cc/TR2N-RRBX] (last modified Aug. 9, 2013);
see also Organic Seed Growers & Trade Ass’n v. Monsanto Co., 718 F.3d 1350, 1357
(Fed. Cir. 2013) (“[T]he district court held that it is likely inevitable that conven-
tional crops will be contaminated by trace amounts of windblown pollen or seeds
from genetically modified crops or other sources.”).
106. As the written description of the patent at question in J.E.M. makes clear:
The development of a hybrid corn variety involves three steps: (1) the
selection of superior plants from various germplasm pools; (2) the selfing
of the superior plants for several generations to produce a series of in-
bred lines, which although different from each other, each breed true
and are highly uniform; and (3) crossing the selected inbred lines with
unrelated inbred lines to produce the hybrid progeny.
U.S. Patent No. 5,491,295 (issued Feb. 13, 1996).  Each of these steps can, and do,
occur naturally.  The discovery is a way of ensuring reproducibility of a variety,
while the patent claims the variety itself.
107. Furthermore, if the seed corn is naturally occurring, then the patent
must fail the test of novelty under 35 U.S.C. § 102 (2018).
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plant itself must be proven—but there is no similar limitation, nor should
there be, for infringement of a utility patent.108
Furthermore, an innovation must be markedly different from any
found in nature to be patent-eligible.109  One small enterprise, the Lost
Apple Project (the Project), roams the Pacific Northwest looking for lost
apple varieties.110  The Project collects apples from forgotten and aban-
doned orchards and ships the apples to botanists for identification.111  If
the Project finds a “lost” variety, it grafts a wood cutting from the tree onto
new rootstock and propagates the variety.112  Through this process, the
Project has rediscovered twenty-three varieties, helping increase diversity
through heirloom varieties.113  These varieties are not eligible for utility
patent protection.114
Even if an innovator succeeds in obtaining a utility patent, the next
issue is the limited scope of rights associated with patent protection.  A
plant may grow for hundreds of years, reproduce for even longer, and take
many years to become commercially viable.  The lifespan of the commer-
cially viable plant and the enforcement period of a patent is a poor fit.115
An apple tree, for instance, will often bear fruit for fifty years or more—
while under current law, a patent expires twenty years from the date it was
filed.116
Further, patent protection extends only as far as the first sale of the
patented chattel.  After that sale, the innovator’s rights in the chattel are
exhausted, and the patentee no longer has any right to control subsequent
108. See Imazio Nursery, Inc. v. Dania Greenhouses, 69 F.3d 1560, 1569–70
(Fed. Cir. 1995).
109. Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 310 (1980).
110. Gillian Flaccus, 10 Pioneer-Era Apple Types Thought Extinct Found in US




113. Id.; see also Gillian Flaccus, Apple Sleuths Hunt Northwest for Varieties Believed
Extinct, STATESMAN J. (Nov. 22, 2019, 6:00 AM), https://www.statesmanjournal.
com/story/news/2019/11/22/apple-tree-hunt-agriculture-fruit-nature-nonprofit-
vietnam-veteran/4248380002/ [https://perma.cc/CKV7-C665] (“The task is huge.
North America once had 17,000 named varieties of domesticated apples, but only
about 4,000 remain.  The Lost Apple Project believes settlers planted a few hun-
dred varieties in their corner of the Pacific Northwest alone.”).
114. See generally Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 569
U.S. 576 (2013).
115. An apple tree can live for over 100 years, far beyond the duration of a
patent, while taking many years to be profitable and fruitful.  This is one example
of a poor fit between public ordering and innovation.  Michael Tortorello, An Ap-
ple a Day, for 47 Years, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 22, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/
10/23/garden/apple-picking-season-is-here-dont-you-want-more-than-a-macin-
tosh.html [https://perma.cc/RMQ5-BZ3Z] (“An apple tree . . . can live 100 to 150
years on an old-fashioned rootstock.  A 300-year-old tree is not an impossibility.”).
116. BURFORD, supra note 64, at 218 (“[A]pple trees will often fruit for fifty
years or more.”); see also 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2) (2018) (providing timeline for
when patent expires).
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sales of the chattel.117  In other words, if the University of Minnesota sells
scionwood or other propagation materials from the Honeycrisp apple cul-
tivar, then any subsequent purchaser can propagate the cultivar.  The uni-
versity no longer can control the conditions under which a purchaser
propagates the apple or sells the scionwood.  These limitations are there
to protect the public’s interest and promote competition, but they can
have a devasting impact on the value of the technology.118  Patent cover-
age for agrobiotechnology is of crucial importance, but it has significant
limitations.
E. Trademark Protection
Since the days of Clarence Stark and the discovery of the Red Deli-
cious, apple growers have sought to disrupt the apple cart.119  In the inter-
vening years, legislative protection has expanded.  The incentives behind
innovation have become more formalized across many technologies, and
interest in branding the product has increased among innovators seeking
to protect market share.  Trademarks can provide incentives for innova-
tion that differ from other types of intellectual property protection.  At
least one expert has stated that in the software industry—another area of
technology where the traditional system of protection is a poor fit—the
next big battlefield will be over the brands and trademarks, not the pat-
ents and code.120  This same fight is brewing in the apple orchard as well.
Apples are one of the most profitable items sold in grocery stores.121
Trademarks last as long as the mark is source-identifying and used in com-
merce.122  As a result, innovators in the plant field are branding their
plants and using private ordering to graft together trademark protection,
patent protection, and other restrictions.
The Project, discussed above, provides valuable insight into how pri-
vate ordering can supplement public ordering.  Such lost apples are
brandable but not patentable.  If the brand is what a consumer wants, then
it does not matter whether public ordering protects the cultivar or not.  A
newly rediscovered variety can prove just as profitable as a newly patented
117. See Quanta Comput., Inc. v. LG Elecs., Inc., 553 U.S. 617, 621 (2008).
118. See, e.g., Jeremy Sheff, Self-Replicating Technologies, 16 STAN. TECH. L. REV.
229 (2013).
119. See Mercola, supra note 22.
120. MEEKER, supra note 7, at 114 (“The day may come when those who deter-
mine the official versions of large open source projects like Linux will control
some of the most valuable pieces of intellectual property in the world: the name by
which the project is known.  While many in the open source world are poised for a
patent fight, trademark fights may be far more complicated and destructive.  Pat-
ents are a threat from outside the open source community.  Trademark disputes
are a lurking threat from within.”).
121. Ko, supra note 73; see also Industry at a Glance, USAPPLE, https://usap-
ple.org/industry-at-a-glance [https://perma.cc/C82Y-EK7N] (last visited Feb. 24,
2021) (estimating the downstream value of the annual apple crop is $15 billion).
122. See 15 U.S.C. § 1051(a) (2018); id. § 1127.
21
Winston: Bargaining for Innovation
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository,
140 VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 66: p. 119
variety of apple—reflecting the poor fit between public ordering and ap-
ple orchards.  To protect the newly rediscovered variety, the finder can
trademark a brand, market the brand, and license others to distribute that
brand.
In his Pulitzer Prize-winning novel, The Overstory, Richard Powers
wrote that “a named apple is a patentable apple.”123  This is not true—but
is indicative of how entrenched in society the notion of branding and pat-
enting an apple has become.  The first successfully branded apples—The
Pink Lady and the Honeycrisp—are no longer under patent.124  These
branded apples, costing much more than the Red Delicious, changed the
face of the apple market.125  For the first time, apple growers realized that
consumers would pay designer prices for designer apples.126  One of the
earliest designer apples, the Pink Lady, is actually a brand used for several
different varieties including Cripps Pink, Rosy Glow, or Lady in Red culti-
var.127  Growing a Cripps Pink apple does not require a license; however,
to grow and sell a Pink Lady-branded, Cripps Pink apple, the farmer must
pay a fee to the brand holder.128  The brand holder then invests that fee
in marketing the Pink Lady apple to educate consumers to ask for an ap-
ple by brand, not by color.129  Consumers choose to pay the higher prices
branded apples demand, and farmers notice.130  The market has spoken,
and the search continues for the next profitable cultivar.131
Trademarks provide many layers of protection for registrants and
have proven particularly intriguing for agricultural innovators seeking to
123. RICHARD POWERS, THE OVERSTORY 162 (2018).
124. Apple Tree Cripps Pink cultivar, U.S. Plant Patent No. 7,880 (issued June
9, 1992); Apple Tree: Honeycrisp, U.S. Plant Patent No. 7,917 (issued Mar. 20,
1990).
125. Richard Lehnert, Who’s Going to Sell All These Apples?  And Who’s Going to
Buy Them?, GOOD FRUIT GROWER (June 1, 2015), https://www.goodfruit.com/
whos-going-to-sell-all-these-apples/ [https://perma.cc/Q2H2-655P] (“Whether
they’re club apples, new apples, old apples, or just apples, there are a lot of apples
being produced in North America, and more coming from a spate of recent plant-
ings.”). The author argues that the data illustrates that apple growers are on a path
to “[g]row more Honeycrisp and find more varieties like them. Id.
126. Id.
127. Geraldine Walker, Pink Lady, the Brand Pioneer: New Sports of Cripps Pink
Will Be Sold Under the Pink Lady Brand, GOOD FRUIT GROWER (Mar. 15, 2008),
https://www.goodfruit.com/pink-lady-the-brand-pioneer/ [https://perma.cc/
X5XC-4TKW].
128. BRANDT’S FRUIT TREES, INC., PINK LADY® TRADEMARK LICENSE, https://
provarmanagement.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/02/Pink-Lady-Cripps-Pink-
TM-License.pdf [https://perma.cc/NZ9N-H49M].
129. The Pink Lady® Trademark, PINK LADY APPLES, https://pinkladyap-
ples.com/importers-retailers/the-pink-lady-trademark/ [https://perma.cc/8E5M-
K5WL] (last visited Dec. 18, 2020) (“Pink Lady® is a brand.  It is not a description
or name of a tree or apple variety.”).
130. Lehnert, supra note 125.
131. Ko, supra note 73 (“The success of the Honeycrisp ushered in a new wave
of designer apple breeds like Ambrosia, Jazz, Cosmic Crisp, Ruby Frost and Snap
Dragon.”).
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establish brands.132  Brand protection is best achieved through trademark
law that protects any word, slogan, design, or symbol used to identify the
source of origin of particular goods and services.133  Hence, the trademark
serves as a source identifier of goods and services, distinguishing one
source of seed from another.  A trademark allows an agricultural innova-
tor to prevent others from confusing consumers, infringing the trademark
or trading on another’s business, and to ensure goodwill.134  For a trade-
mark to have benefit, however, the trademark must provide source identi-
fication to a consumer, and that requires marketing and consumer
education.  This adds to the cost of the apple and often results in the use
of licenses to control that brand as well.
This rich array of publicly ordered protections still leaves many areas
of innovation inadequately protected.  The market demand and the inade-
quate fit of public ordering have led to the use of physical protections and
private ordering as a way of augmenting available protection.  Innovators,
and those who invest in research and development, want to profit from
their work.  No matter what protection is offered, if there is no market,
then the incentives are limited.135  Public ordering and private ordering
provide incentives for innovation, but the bottom line drives research and
development.  The most significant disconnect between public ordering
and innovation occurs when the incentives provided by the market far out-
pace any incentives provided by public ordering.  It is in this space that
reformation must occur.
II. PRIVATE INCENTIVES FOR INNOVATION
Market demand may drive innovation, but innovation flourishes with
protection.  When market demand, public ordering, and private ordering
all coexist, private ordering must be carefully examined to ensure that it
does not subsume the public’s interest in favor of the innovator.  Reliance
on private ordering signals a poor fit between the interests of the innova-
tors and the publicly legislated protection offered to the consumer.  Pri-
vate ordering, however, does not necessarily reflect a broken market.
Congress and courts should uphold public and private ordering pairs
132. In fact, some have argued that trademark protection may be more valua-
ble than patent protection due to the limited duration of the patent right. See, e.g.,
Eli Lilly & Co. & Subsidiaries v. Comm’r of Internal Revenue, 84 T.C. 996, 1167
(1985) (“[A]fter the patent’s expiration, the trademark was the intangible with the
greater value.”), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 856 F.2d 855 (7th Cir. 1988).
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Nicola Davison, Why Can’t We Cure the Common Cold?: After Thousands of
Years of Failure, Some Scientists Believe a Breakthrough Might Finally Be In Sight, GUARD-
IAN (Oct. 6, 2017, 1:00 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/news/2017/oct/06/
why-cant-we-cure-the-common-cold [https://perma.cc/ZY48-58LM] (“You . . .
can’t do it if there’s not a market at the end, you’re wasting the company’s money,
and if you do that too often, you’ll bankrupt the company . . . .” (internal quota-
tion marks omitted)).
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when the innovators’ intentions are not to circumvent public restrictions.
Private ordering helps enforce factors peculiar to a particular industry.
But when private ordering removes rights from those without bargaining
power and eliminates mandatory disclosure, then those contracts are vio-
lating public policy and ought not to be enforced.
In many ways, our intellectual property system is a poor fit for modern
technology.136  The duration of the patent term is a poor fit for agrobi-
otechnology innovations,137 chefs and comedians are reluctant to rely on
a system of rights that has historically not protected their arts,138 software
developers struggle to find a way to protect their innovations,139 and ge-
netic engineers are redesigning their innovations to avoid having to rely
upon the laws for the protection of the technology.  Absent change, those
leading the evolution will leave the intellectual property system behind,
seeking protection through forms that do not uphold the public’s interest
in building a storehouse of knowledge.
Innovators are turning away from relying solely on the intellectual
property system for incentives for a number of reasons, including industry-
specific factors, historical norms, market incentives, and gaps in the cover-
age of the publicly ordered system.  When innovators rely on private or-
dering to fill in the gaps, the publicly ordered system of protection should
be reevaluated by Congress to determine why the gaps exist in the first
place.
In the field of culinary arts, for instance, chefs should not have to rely
on non-disclosure agreements to protect recipes—instead, such recipes
should be protected under copyright law.140  A list of ingredients and the
136. OFFICE OF TECH. ASSESSMENT, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS IN AN AGE
OF ELECTRONICS AND INFORMATION iii (Apr. 1986), http://www.princeton.edu/
~ota/disk2/1986/8610/861007.PDF [https://perma.cc/ZN5N-FEVH] (“Funda-
mental changes are occurring in information technologies that will antiquate
many of the policy mechanisms now in force, and bring new intellectual property
problems requiring new solutions.”).
137. See discussion infra Section II.D (Apples).
138. See discussion infra Section II.B (Comedians) & II.C (The Culinary
Arts).
139. See discussion infra Section II.A (Software).
140. See, e.g., Uncle B’s Bakery, Inc. v. O’Rourke, 920 F. Supp. 1405, 1413–14
(N.D. Iowa 1996).  The bagel bakery carefully guards its recipes as trade secrets.
[A]nyone who visits Uncle B’s Bakery’s plant is required to sign a confi-
dentiality agreement.  Indeed, employees are instructed that if any unes-
corted person appears in the plant, that person is to be escorted to the
company’s offices to complete a confidentiality agreement before he or
she can conduct any other business or visit any portion of the plant.
Id. at 1413.  In addition, the bagel bakery requires all of its suppliers to “keep
confidential Uncle B’s Bakery’s use of particular machinery or supplies” and, in
some cases, “forbidding the suppliers from providing identical products to Uncle
B’s Bakery’s competitors, as well as requiring them not to disclose Uncle B’s
Bakery’s use of such products.” Id. at 1414.  Finally, all employees must sign a
“non–disclosure/non–compete” at the start of their employment. Id. at 1416.  The
agreement covers “the development of original and unique recipes, ingredients,
manufacturing techniques, packaging techniques, proceses [sic] involved in the
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process of making it may not be copyrightable,141 but the fixed represen-
tation of the dish consumed should be protectable.  Food can be art, and
art is copyrightable.142  Recipes are a description of a process but a
description that disseminates an artist’s knowledge.  Kitchens should not
have to rely on non-compete agreements to protect their investments in
the culinary arts.
The agrobiotechnology innovators and the genetic engineers have a
physical form of intellectual property to work with—where the marketable
product and the innovation are one and the same.  This presents industry-
specific issues—if a bacterium is sold, then the purchaser has complete
access to the innovation.  In these heavily concentrated fields, there are
tremendous barriers to entry, and no single form of intellectual property
has proven a natural fit.143  As a result, the innovators are changing the
technology itself, as well as seeking to partner private and public ordering
together.  At one point in history, physical protection of such technology
involved a lock and key, whereas today that protection may involve chang-
ing the nature of the intellectual property—turning the individual bacte-
rium into its own physical protection.144  Our intellectual property system
should not be incentivizing innovation that seeks to terminate itself.
production and/or packaging of Employer’s products, equipment brands and
types used, and trade secrets for the production and packaging of bread products.”
Id. at 1414 (alteration in original); see also Christopher J. Buccafusco, On the Legal
Consequences of Sauces: Should Thomas Keller’s Recipes Be Per Se Copyrightable?, 24 CAR-
DOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 1121, 1151 (2007) (explaining the potential for a relation-
ship between culinary arts and copyrights).
141. Publ’ns Int’l, Ltd. v. Meredith Corp., 88 F.3d 473, 480 (7th Cir. 1996).
142. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a)(5) (2018) (“Copyright protection subsists . . . in pic-
torial, graphic and sculptural works . . . .”).
143. David A. Domina & C. Robert Taylor, The Debilitating Effects of Concentra-
tion Markets Affecting Agriculture, 15 DRAKE J. AGRIC. L. 61, 79 (2010); Philip H. How-
ard, Visualizing Consolidation in the Global Seed Industry: 1996–2008, 1 SUSTAINABILITY
1266, 1270–71 (2009), http://www.mdpi.com/2071-1050/1/4/1266/ [https://
perma.cc/77NX-6CBJ]; Rebecca K. Stewart, Weeds, Seeds & Deeds Redux: Natural and
Legal Evolution in the U.S. Seed Wars, 18 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 79 (2014).
144. For instance, a pair of researchers developed a new technique, whereby a
genetically modified organism inserted into an organism eliminates its own genetic
modification before it dies.  Bob Yirka, Researchers Use CRSIPR to Create “Kill Switch”
for GMOs, PHYS.ORG (May 20, 2015), https://phys.org/news/2015-05-crispr-
gmos.html [https://perma.cc/MDP2-LXV3].  This technique was partly designed
to protect trade secrets.  If the organism can eliminate its own modification, the
organism itself prevents others from seeing the particular genetic modification
made.  Brian Caliando & Christopher A. Voight, Targeted DNA Degradation Using a
CRISPR Device Stably Carried in the Host Gene, NATURE COMM., May 2015, at 2, https:/
/www.nature.com/articles/ncomms7989 [https://perma.cc/H9G5-5CXL] (“The
ability to programme cells to eliminate engineered DNA at a defined time point or
change in environments would benefit many applications in biotechnology.  For
example, after bio-manufacturing a chemical, cells could be programmed to de-
grade their DNA at the end of the process or when they are removed from a de-
fined medium.  This would aid the protection of sequence information as a trade
secret . . . .”).
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Comics have long felt that the intellectual property system is a poor fit
for humor because some jokes are meant to be shared, some are meant to
survive multiple lifetimes with attribution to a single author,145 and some
are simply used without attribution.  Stand-up comics use private ordering
to supplement the available copyright protection for their humor.  This
may result in a greater harm to competition than the comedians fully un-
derstand.  The aggregate impact of copyright protection, private ordering,
and self-regulation needs to be closely examined in order to better pro-
mote the public’s and comedians’ interest.
Software was the true game-changer behind the shift from publicly
ordered protection to privately ordered protection.146  Originally,
software was something so new that no intellectual property protection
applied.  Developers turned to licenses while pushing for change in the
publicly ordered protections offered.147  Today, software is protected
through a robust system of licenses, patent law, trademark law, and copy-
right law.  Even still, changes could be made to the protections offered
software.
The use of contracts to privately legislate and incentivize innovation is
fundamentally different from the publicly legislated grant of rights and
incentives.  For instance, innovators have a very limited ability to control
their works after the first sale if they are relying solely on publicly ordered
rights.  Although limited in enforcement by the requirement of privity, the
use of contracts to license a product instead of selling it can circumvent
those restrictions.148  This betrays the bargain sought by Congress and the
courts in granting these protections in the first place.  The incentives pro-
vided by private ordering are exceeding the scope of traditional intellec-
tual property rights and expanding the protection of intellectual property.
This lack of protection has wide-ranging implications.
Enforcing privately negotiated agreements that circumvent public leg-
islation vitiates the existing statutory scheme of intellectual property pro-
tection.  Contracts, licenses, and self-regulation require trust and
power.149  The intellectual property system protects the public but will
only be used as long as its benefits outweigh its restrictions.  A careful bal-
ance must be struck between the benefits of private ordering and the re-
145. When a comic says “I came to a fork in the road and took it,” no one
would think that comic was doing anything other than quoting the great Yogi
Berra, for instance. When You Come to a Fork in the Road, Take It, QUOTE INVESTIGA-
TOR (July 25, 2013), https://quoteinvestigator.com/2013/07/25/fork-road/
[https://perma.cc/CTM2-D2UH].
146. See, e.g., Christian H. Nadan, Software Licensing in the 21st Century: Are
Software “Licenses” Really Sales, and How Will the Software Industry Respond?, 32 AIPLA
Q.J. 555, 574 (2004).
147. Id.
148. See Bobbs-Merrill Co. v. Straus, 210 U.S. 339, 350 (1908).
149. For a longer discussion of this issue, see M. TODD HENDERSON & SALEN
CHURI, THE TRUST REVOLUTION: HOW THE DIGITIZATION OF TRUST WILL REVOLU-
TIONIZE BUSINESS AND GOVERNMENT (2019).
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strictions of public ordering to ensure that the proper incentives are in
place to promote the progress of science and the useful arts.
A. Software
Privately legislating innovation protection did not take root and flour-
ish until computer software arrived on the scene.  Software was new and
brought with it no consumer-expected set of rights.  Innovators took ad-
vantage of the lack of consumer rights and inadequate statutory scheme to
protect their software innovations.150  Software was different and difficult
to protect.  Consumers purchasing a book brought a preconceived notion
of a set of rights, one that did not limit the consumer’s use of the book.151
No such notion, however, existed for software.  Software was new, difficult
to protect, expensive to develop, and easy to replicate.152  There was mar-
ket demand, tremendous innovation, and a poor fit with public ordering.
As a result, the software industry promulgated a standard of private legisla-
tion, whereby licensing products that embody intellectual property be-
came the norm.153  This model proved profitable.
In the absence of clear, publicly ordered protection for software inno-
vations, the use of contracts to supplement intellectual property protec-
tion gained popularity.154  Copyright law was a poor fit, and the question
of whether software is patent-eligible or not was fraught with doubt, thus,
innovators sought protection for their innovations through private order-
150. See, e.g., Adobe Sys. Inc. v. One Stop Micro, Inc., 84 F. Supp. 2d 1086,
1091–92 (N.D. Cal. 2000).
151. This preconceived set of rights is changing.  Students are increasingly
renting textbooks to avoid paying the high costs of ownership, professors are as-
signing links to articles rather than paying for republication rights, and new re-
sources are being created to allow this to happen.  The students who lease
textbooks may be paying less for the book, but they are also receiving fewer
rights—whether it is the right to resell the book, the right to use the book for
other classes down the road, or even the right to write in and highlight the book.
The professor who assigns a link, instead of paying for republication rights, is tak-
ing business away from the author and publisher of the original article—causing
those parties to have to find new ways to earn a living.  The distinction between the
purchase of a book and the licensing of a piece of software, between the purchase
of a physical recording of music, and the licensing of a download of music is blur-
ring—as are the protections associated with each transaction.
152. See generally Ronald J. Mann, Do Patents Facilitate Financing in the Software
Industry?, 83 TEX. L. REV. 961 (2005) (describing the role that patents play in the
software industry).
153. See generally Mark A. Lemley, Intellectual Property and Shrinkwrap Licenses,
68 S. CAL. L. REV. 1239, 1251 (1995).
154. See, e.g., Softman Prods. Co. v. Adobe Sys., Inc., 171 F. Supp. 2d 1075,
1083 (C.D. Cal. 2001) (“Historically, the purpose of ‘licensing’ computer program
copy use was to employ contract terms to augment trade secret protection in order
to protect against unauthorized copying at a time when, first, the existence of a
copyright in computer programs was doubtful, and, later, when the extent to
which copyright provided protection was uncertain.”).
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ing.155  Software developers licensed their products rather than selling
them, using the contractual terms to augment the available public protec-
tion for ideas and expressions.156  When software licenses augment the IP
system, Congress and courts ought to enforce them, as they allow innova-
tors to protect investments and the IP system to incentivize innovation.  As
patent protections expanded to cover software, the system saw a spike in
filing seeking protection of software, the storehouse of knowledge in-
creased, and competition between innovators became even more fierce.157
At the same time, software developers continued to rely upon licenses to
protect their inventions.
Licenses allow software developers more certainty in delineating the
scope of protection than patent law.  Abstract ideas, in and of themselves,
are not patent-eligible.158  Protection for the e-reader is far easier to delin-
eate than protection for the data downloaded on the e-reader.  And pro-
tection for data downloaded is still easier to delineate than protection for
the software allowing the user to download the data.  The e-reader is tangi-
ble, the data displayed on the screen may be tangible, but the software is
intangible.  Intangible, however, does not necessarily mean abstract—and
it is this conundrum that renders protection so uncertain for software.
The more barriers Congress and the courts presented to those seeking to
protect software, the riskier applying for a software patent became.
Many developers have determined that the risks inherent in seeking
patent protection for their software outweigh the benefits that such pro-
tection gives the patentees.  Disclosing valuable information with no prom-
ise of a meaningful reward benefits the public and costs the innovator.
The current diminished level of clarity as to what is patent-eligible yields
unpredictable results—leaving patentees, potential infringers, and inves-
tors uncertain as to whether a patent issued today will be enforceable to-
morrow.159  Software developers, therefore, facing issues of protectability
have turned increasingly to licensing their software, rather than selling it.
Those licenses often contain clauses that completely eviscerate the restric-
155. See Alice Corp. Pty. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 573 U.S. 208, 221 (2014)
(“[M]ethod claims, which merely require generic computer implementation, fail
to transform that abstract idea into a patent-eligible invention.”).
156. See, e.g., Softman Prods., 171 F. Supp. 2d at 1083.
157. See KEVIN G. RIVETTE & DAVID KLINE, REMBRANDTS IN THE ATTIC 17–18
(1999) (“The expansion of patentable subject matter into new and ever more ab-
stract realms has always met with resistance. . . .  [C]ritics warned that these new
kinds of patents would be harmful to scientific discovery and innovation.  And yet
in each case, innovation and discovery actually intensified.”).
158. Alice, 573 U.S. at 221.
159. See, e.g., John P. Walsh, Effects of Research Tool Patents and Licensing on Bi-
omedical Innovation, in PATENTS IN THE KNOWLEDGE-BASED ECONOMY 294 n.13 (Wes-
ley M. Cohen & Stephen A. Merrill eds., 2003) (“Some firms have also begun
concentrating on their most promising targets, because of the high cost of main-
taining patents and the low value of many . . . patents . . . that may not give rights
to downstream developments . . . .”).
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tions on public ordering.160  Private ordering is limited by privity, but
when it is used to frustrate fair use, circumvent the first sale doctrine, with-
hold warranties, obstruct the on-sale bar, and withhold many other rights
from the possessors of chattels, privity seems a small limitation indeed.
Contracts are being used not to fill in the gaps, but to address the uncer-
tainties currently present in public ordering and to circumvent the restric-
tions inherent in the intellectual property system.161
The publicly ordered restrictions protect the public interest—grant-
ing the public a limited set of rights during the patent term.  The intellec-
tual property system is robust in its protections—yet vague in its
boundaries—which harms both the innovator and the public.  Innovators
are replacing the uncertainty of the intellectual property system, with
clearly delineated protections in the form of licenses and contracts.
Before the norm thus shifts permanently, careful consideration must be
given to maintaining the balance between the interests of the public and
intellectual property owners.  Congress should legislate certainty and en-
sure that both innovators and the public are protected.  Patent-eligible
subject matter must have its definition further codified before the balance
shifts from the public’s interest to the innovator’s interest.  The intellec-
tual property system is designed to protect software, but those protections
must be delineated to allow developers to truly weigh the risks and bene-
fits of seeking patent protection for their software innovation.
B. Comedians
In the stand-up comedy industry, private ordering has become the
norm in protecting jokes.162  Copyright law can protect jokes, but copy-
160. Examples abound of intellectual property owners restricting the rights of
consumers through licenses.  James Gleick, Fast Forward: It’s Your Problem (Not
Theirs), N.Y TIMES, May 10, 1998, at 16, https://www.nytimes.com/1998/05/10/
magazine/fast-forward-it-s-your-problem-not-theirs.html [https://perma.cc/7ZLB-
RJJH] (“[T]he agreement that comes with Microsoft Agent, software that lets users
create cute interactive animated figures, holds that you may not use the characters
‘to disparage Microsoft, its products or services.’”).
161. A plant patent, for instance, covers only the variety patented and not any
mutations of that variety.  Growers who license the WA 38 apple agree to promptly
notify the patentee of “any mutation that may appear on Licensed Trees” and fur-
ther agree that “ownership of, and title to, any such mutations” belongs to the
patentee. WASH. STATE UNIV., NON-EXCLUSIVE GROWER AGREEMENT (WA 38 APPLE
VARIETY), https://provarmanagement.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/02/WA38-
grower-contract.pdf [https://perma.cc/3QP8-BVP8].  The license, therefore, di-
rectly circumvents the Plant Patent Act retaining for the patentee title to WA 38
mutations.
162. See Dotan Oliar & Christopher Sprigman, There’s No Free Laugh (Anymore):
The Emergence of Intellectual Property Norms and the Transformation of Stand-Up Comedy,
94 VA. L. REV. 1787, 1789 (2008) (failing to “find even a single copyright infringe-
ment lawsuit between rival comedians”).  Comedians resort to private ordering to
protect their jokes instead, making it “clear to comedy club booking agents that
they would not appear in the same evening’s lineup with someone they believed
either had stolen their material or had a reputation of stealing jokes.” Id. at 1817.
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right infringement suits over humor are, at best, a joke.163  There have
been lawsuits involving the business of humor but not the intellectual
property of a comedian.164  This is, in no small part, because public order-
ing does not effectively protect authorship of jokes,165 ownership,166and
derivation; and issues of fair use and other exceptions undermine the
ideas that comedians seek to protect in the first place.167  Despite this,
innovation flourishes,168 relying on the industry standard of private order-
ing and self-regulation.  Self-regulation gives comedians, who feel that
their jokes were stolen, the ability to have the comedic thieves banned
from clubs—a private injunction of sorts.169  If that does not work, private
ordering allows comedians to band together and block out a purported
joke thief by refusing to appear on the same program or even at the same
club as the thief.170  Through self-regulation, comedians have come up
with creative methods of protecting their material.  For instance, in per-
forming comedy at a club, comedians often rely on a light to tell them
163. See generally id.
164. Id. at 1798 n.32.
165. For instance, the following short poem has been recited for almost a
century:
I eat my peas with honey,
I’ve done it all my life.
It makes the peas taste funny,
But it keeps them on the knife.
Yet, no author can be found for this poem.  Public ordering has not fully protected
the author of this poem.  Attribution has been given to Ogden Nash and Shel
Silverstein but has never been proven.  Barry Popik, “I Eat My Peas with Honey; I’ve
Done it All My Life . . .” (Poem), BIG APPLE (Feb. 1, 2011), https://
www.barrypopik.com/index.php/new_york_city/entry/
i_eat_my_peas_with_honey_ive_done_it_all_my_life [https://perma.cc/FV92-
VXN7].  At the same time, no current comedian is seeking to use that humor,
suggesting ownership or infringing on the anonymity of the original authorship.
166. Copyright protection is limited in its duration, while most comedians
believe that you can never appropriate another’s joke, even long after the death of
the originator.  Oliar & Sprigman, supra note 162, at 1824.
167. Id.
168. See, e.g., Brian Steinberg, “Saturday Night Live” Plans “At Home” Season Fi-
nale, VARIETY (May 7, 2020, 9:11 AM), https://variety.com/2020/tv/news/satur-
day-night-live-at-home-season-finale-1234600748/ [https://perma.cc/4N4T-A9KG]
(“‘SNL’ typically runs live in front of an in-studio audience whose reactions lend
the program much of its energy and ambiance—and add an element of ‘anything
could happen’ to its proceedings.  But the advent of the coronavirus pandemic has
made producing a typical program impossible.  Producers at the venerable late-
night series, supervised by Lorne Michaels, have created a series of ‘at home’ epi-
sodes, featuring taped sketches cobbled together by cast members sheltering at
home and other production staff.”).
169. Oliar & Sprigman, supra note 162, at 1815 (“The guy [who thinks he’s
been stolen from] is going to try to get the [other comedian] banned from clubs.”
(alterations in original)).
170. Id. at 1817 (“A number of interviewees told us of instances where they
made clear to comedy club booking agents that they would not appear in the same
evening’s lineup with someone they believed either had stolen their material or
had a reputation of stealing jokes.”).
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when their time is up.171  That light can be used to signal a comedian that
a potential infringer is in the house, allowing the comedian to switch to
material that the comedian is less protective of.172  Such self-regulation
and private ordering has allowed for innovation in the stand-up comedy
arena.  When these contracts do not breach the public’s trust and operate
within the boundaries set by antitrust law, then they should be enforced—
allowing, as they do, for industry standards to promulgate protections.  Co-
medians do not have to go to court to provide infringement of their act (a
difficult case to make, particularly in a timely fashion), and the comics and
clubs can work together to promote the interests of all.173  On the other
hand, when comedians take private ordering too far, it should not be
enforced.
One comedian, for instance, required those attending a show to sign
a non-disclosure agreement.174  The venue where the comedian per-
formed sent the non-disclosure agreement to ticket purchasers and de-
nied entrance to those refusing to sign the contract.175  The agreement
stated: “the individual shall not give any interviews, offer any opinions or
critiques, or otherwise participate by any means or in any form whatsoever
(including but not limited to blogs, Twitter, Facebook, YouTube, In-
stagram, or any other social networking or other websites whether now
existing or hereafter created).”176  The non-disclosure agreement con-
171. See, e.g., Open Mic Comedians Code of Conduct, MCCURDY’S COMEDY THEA-
TRE & HUMOR INST., https://www.mccurdyscomedy.com/theatre/conduct.cfm
[https://perma.cc/JNF8-ELSH] (last visited Feb. 24, 2021) (“Your time begins
from the moment the host has introduced you.  There is a light and clock on a
stool on the front corner of the stage.  When you have one minute left in your set
the light will come on and stay on.  When you have arrived at the end of your time
the light will flash a few times and then the music will gradually fade up.  You
should have your set timed so that you don’t need the light.  That is a step in the
right direction towards being a professional.”).
172. Larry Getlen, Take the Funny and Run: How Some of the Biggest Names in
Comedy Built Their Careers on Pilfered Punchlines, RADAR (Feb. 14, 2007), quoted by
William Patry, Jokes and Copyright, PATRY COPYRIGHT BL. (Jan. 29, 2008), http://
williampatry.blogspot.com/2008/01/jokes-and-copyright.html [permalink unavail-
able] (“Anyone who has ever performed stand-up is familiar with the red light, the
universal signal that warns dawdlers it’s time to wrap things up.  In the ’80s, comics
at the Hollywood Improv came up with a novel use for the light. When shining
steadily, it had the conventional meaning.  But if the bulb began sputtering, it was
the comedic equivalent of an air-raid siren, warning performers to lock up their
original material immediately unless they wanted to lose it to a master thief.  Robin
Williams, comedy’s most notorious joke rustler, was in the house.”).
173. The lack of effective protection is, in part, because comedians believed
that bringing suit over stolen material was simply too expensive.  Oliar &
Sprigman, supra note 162, at 1800–01.
174. Meredith Woerner, Pete Davidson Asks Fans to Sign $1 Million NDA Before
Comedy Show, VARIETY (Nov. 30, 2019, 2:54 PM), https://variety.com/2019/tv/
news/pete-davidson-nda-sign-snl-saturday-night-live-dave-chappelle-1203420180/
[https://perma.cc/SKN4-HTG6].
175. Id. (“After refusing to sign the NDA emailed to her from the venue, [one
ticket-holder] was given a full refund . . . .”).
176. Id.
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tained a liquidated damages clause assessing the damages for a breach at
$1 million.177  It is a joke to suggest that the intellectual property was
worth that amount, but the chilling effect of that liquidated damages
clause is significant enough that it is unlikely a court would have the op-
portunity to determine its punitive nature and enforceability.
Public ordering protects humor.  The Constitution gives Congress the
power to secure to authors the exclusive right to their writings for a lim-
ited time.178  Comics are authors.  However, copyright law does not ex-
tend to an idea—so if the amusing part of the humor is not the wording
but the idea behind it, protecting that idea is not possible.  Furthermore,
comedy is often time-sensitive, and by the time one comic sues another
comic for infringement and wins, the time for the humor may have
passed.  Legislating additional incentives for comedy would be difficult,
expensive, and require a fundamental shift in the industry norms.  Private
ordering and self-regulation allow for timely and inexpensive humor pro-
tection that favors the successful in a way that public ordering does not.
For instance, Pete Davidson could require fans to sign a non-disclosure
agreement because fans were eager to watch Pete Davidson.  On the other
hand, Comedienne Jane, still working to build up an audience, would lack
the same ability to dictate terms to her audience—eager as she might be to
simply have an audience in the first place.  That being said, the industry
standards and norms in comedy seem to indicate that private ordering
works.  When private ordering is extended too far—favoring the innovator
and those with market power over the public interest—it runs counter to
the policy choices made in promulgating public ordering.  The limits on
public ordering are there for a reason, and as long as the private ordering
upholds those limitations, it should be enforced.  In other words, if private
ordering is used to provide an efficient and effective way of policing in-
fringement, then it is working, but when private ordering seeks to take
away rights that the public is entitled to—through a non-compete or other
means—the contract violates public policy and cannot be enforced.
C. The Culinary Arts
The kitchen gives us yet another area that public ordering fails to
protect.  Recipes can rarely be patented,179 copyright protection does not
177. Id. (“In the event of breach of this agreement, individual shall pay com-
pany, upon demand, as liquidated damages, the sum of one million dollars, plus
any out of pocket expense.”).  It is highly unlikely that Davidson would be able to
recover that sum, since he would have prove the amount was not disproportionate
to his actual harm—but it is certain that such a clause would have a chilling effect
on those thinking about breaching.
178. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
179. That being said, there are some recipes that meet the stringent patenta-
bility standards and have resulted in legal protection.  For example, U.S. Patent
No. 4,455,333 (issued June 19, 1984), entitled Doughs and Cookies Providing Storage-
Stable Texture and Variability (the ’333 Patent), claims a cookie made from two dif-
ferent cookie doughs which, when baked, produces a cookie product with a crispy
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extend to a functional list of ingredients,180 and trade secret protection
has its limitations.181  So, how to protect the investment in developing a
new food industry, a novel restaurant concept, or a unique recipe?  Inves-
tors, innovators, and restauranteurs have increasingly turned to private or-
dering to protect their innovations.
Chefs and restaurants are using contracts in innovative ways in the
kitchen, the restaurant, and elsewhere.182  Noted chef Homaro Cantu of
Moto Restaurant in Chicago was one who pushed the bounds of private
ordering.183  When dining at Moto, consumers at one point could order a
dish made of edible paper—the paper tasted like cotton candy and was
imprinted with cotton candy images.  Also imprinted on the paper was the
warning: “Confidential Property of and © H. Cantu.  Patent Pending.  No
further use or disclosure is permitted without prior approval of H.
Cantu.”184  Elegantly showcasing the grafting of public and private order-
ing, Chef Cantu patented his innovation while still relying on a contract
with the diner to control all further use and disclosure of the dish.185
Under the first sale doctrine, once Cantu sold his patented dish—presum-
ably when the diner orders from his menu—Cantu could not rely on his
patent rights to restrict the diner’s use or redistribution of the dish.186
The private ordering here, where the diner agrees to a contract with the
chef and may take possession of the intellectual property (but not use it
and chewy texture.  Claim 35 of the ’333 patent defines the process for making the
final cookie product from two different doughs, which are made from “typical
cookie ingredients” such as sugar, flour, water, and shortening, and are conven-
tional cookie doughs differing only in the type of sugar that is used to prepare
them.  The claim was later invalidated as anticipated but still serves as an example
of a recipe that consists of patent-eligible subject matter.  Procter & Gamble Co. v.
Nabisco Brands, Inc., 711 F. Supp. 759, 776 (D. Del. 1989).
180. Publ’ns Int’l, Ltd. v. Meredith Corp., 88 F.3d 473, 480 (7th Cir. 1996).
181. Even if a trade secret is stolen, recourse can be had only if the judicial
system agrees with the owner of the trade secret that the trade secret existed in the
first place.  In one example, a bakery alleged that their secret “famous salted cara-
mel brownie recipe” had been stolen.  The judge ruled that there was no trade
secret theft because the recipe was hardly unique. See Vrailment Hosp., LLC v.
Binkowski, No. 8:11-CV-1240-T-33TGW, 2012 WL 1493737, at *14 (M.D. Fla. Mar.
19, 2012), report and recommendation adopted by 2012 WL 1470309 (M.D. Fla. June 6,
2011).





185. See, e.g., System and Methods for Preparing Substitute Food Items, U.S.
Patent No. 7,307,249 (issued Dec. 11, 2007); see also Wells, supra note 182 (“In
Cantu’s view, licensing his intellectual property is a more efficient way to tap new
revenue streams than opening a casual Moto brasserie across the street.”).
186. There is one exception.  If the product in question is patented, then
post-sale restrictions may be placed on the product if such restrictions are reasona-
bly related to the patent and are less than the scope of the patent itself. See Mal-
linckrodt, Inc. v. Medipart, Inc., 976 F.2d 700, 708–10 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
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further without permission of the chef), frustrates the first sale doctrine—
allowing the chef to have his cake and eat it too.  To protect his intellec-
tual property, Cantu relied on private ordering rather than the more cas-
ual industry standard of information trading.187  Cantu carried this
through to all parts of his restaurant.  Before being allowed to enter
Cantu’s kitchen, chefs had to sign a four-page non-disclosure agreement—
giving Cantu a remedy if copying occurred.188  Private ordering protected
what public ordering could not.
On the other hand, using non-compete agreements to infringe upon
the rights of an employee in a commercial kitchen could violate public
policy.  In 2014, many employees of Jimmy John’s sandwich signed the
following non-compete clause when entering into employment with the
company:
Employee covenants and agrees that, during his or her employ-
ment with the Employer and for a period of two (2) years after
. . . he or she will not have any direct or indirect interest in or
perform services for . . . any business which derives more than
ten percent (10%) of its revenue from selling submarine, hero-
type, deli-style, pita and/or wrapped or rolled sandwiches and
which is located with three (3) miles of either [the Jimmy John’s
location in question] or any such other Jimmy John’s Sandwich
Shop.189
Such non-compete clauses are often used to protect a firm’s intellectual
property, trade secrets, and investment in its valuable employees.  This
clause protected neither and should not be enforceable.190  It may be eas-
ier to find a bargained-for exchange when a famous chef signs a non-com-
pete agreement as part of their employment by a well-known
187. Buccafusco, supra note 140, at 1152–53 (discussing interviews with a
number of chefs who said that sharing was part of the kitchen culture).  One chef
stated “I write cookbooks and teach classes so folks will use my recipes.  I am quite
happy when a layperson uses my recipes and I would also be just as happy, maybe
more so, if a professional were to, provided that they gave credit in some way shape
or form.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Email from Norman
Van Aken, Executive Chef-Owner, Norman’s, to Christopher J. Buccafusco (Aug. 3,
2006) (on file with author)).
188. See Wells, supra note 182.
189. Dave Jamieson, Jimmy John’s Makes Low-Wage Workers Sign “Oppressive”
Noncompete Agreements, HUFFINGTON POST, https://www.huffpost.com/entry/jimmy-
johns-non-compete_n_5978180 [https://perma.cc/J6XL-882Z] (last updated Oct.
15, 2014) (alterations in original).
190. Even though a recipe may be a closely-held trade secret, it may still be
lawfully reverse-engineered.  Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 476
(1974) (“A trade secret law, however, does not offer protection against discovery by
fair and honest means, such as by independent invention, accidental disclosure, or
by so-called reverse engineering, that is by starting with the known product and
working backward to divine the process which aided in its development or
manufacture.”).
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restaurant.191  The chef may be a valuable employee who is entrusted with
a restaurant’s trade secrets—but what should that non-compete be allowed
to cover?  When a chef leaves, should the chef be able to take their signa-
ture dishes with them, or should the contract be allowed to control the
dish itself?192  If a particular dish is not protectable through public order-
ing, why do we allow private ordering to control the dish?  Such a non-
compete clause may be bargained for, but at what cost to all?  More than
one chef has found their careers crippled by a non-compete.  Upon mov-
ing to New York to become the Executive Chef of the Williamsburg Hotel,
Chef Adam Leonti signed a contract that promised him $130,000 a year.
Unfortunately, this contract also contained a non-compete clause stating
that Leonti could not “work at any food-service establishment in all of New
York City for one year if he were to resign.”193  During his time at the
Williamsburg Hotel, Leonti developed not a single recipe, gained access to
no proprietary information, and yet, upon his resignation, was held to his
non-compete agreement and could not cook for any other restaurant in
New York City.194  He was forced to choose between his livelihood and his
residence due to a contract he signed.
Innovation occurs in the kitchen, despite a lack of publicly ordered
adequate protection for recipes.195  Much of that innovation occurs ab-
sent private ordering or other forms of legal protection.  Chefs engage in
information trading—where they pass on tricks they have learned and
benefit from the receipt of similarly valuable information.196  Further-
191. This may be true even when the non-compete limits the chef’s ability to
use his own name. See, e.g., Amy McCarthy, Kent Rathburn Legally Can’t Call Himself
“The Chef With No Name,” DALL. OBSERVER (Apr. 12, 2017), https://dallas.
eater.com/2017/4/12/15273604/dallas-kent-rathbun-nickname-injunction-aba
cus-lawsuit [permalink unavailable].
192. See, e.g., Erik Weibust & Anne Dunne, Fettucine Al Fraudo—New York Piz-
zaiolo in Hot Water After Alleged Theft of Secret Pasta Recipe, SEYFARTH: TRADING SECRETS
(Dec. 11, 2019), https://www.tradesecretslaw.com/2019/12/articles/noncom-
pete-enforceability/fettucine-al-fraudo-new-york-pizzaiolo-in-hot-water-after-al-
leged-theft-of-secret-pasta-recipe/ [https://perma.cc/8QUW-H3U8] (“[The chef]
signed a non-compete and non-disclosure agreement in connection with his hir-
ing, under which [the chef] agreed, for ten years, to not replicate, copy, or dupli-
cate . . . its ‘signature recipes’ for arancine, pasta alla norma, caponata, anelletti al
forno, and carbonara di mare, or to use the signature recipes within a ten mile
radius of [the] restaurant.”).
193. Andrea Strong, Non-Compete Agreements Can Be Crippling For Chefs, EATER
(Oct. 13, 2017, 11:22 AM), https://www.eater.com/2017/10/13/16459044/non-
competes-chefs-how-do-they-work [permalink unavailable].
194. Id.
195. See, e.g., Jess Kapadia, The 20 Wildest, Weirdest and Most Delicious Recipes of
the Year, FOOD REPUBLIC (Dec. 21, 2015), https://www.foodrepublic.com/2015/
12/21/the-20-wildest-weirdest-and-most-delicious-recipes-of-the-year/ [https://
perma.cc/F6NL-GCSV] (writing about experiencing “recipe developer Paul Harri-
son’s patented In-N-Out grilled cheese.  It’s not actually patented—you can’t pat-
ent a grilled cheese, let alone one that someone else created.”).
196. See Emmanuelle Fauchart & Eric von Hippel, Norms-Based Intellectual Prop-
erty Systems: The Case of French Chefs, 19 ORG. SCI. 187, 194 (2008) (“In the case of
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more, chefs abide by a strong industry norm that chefs will not copy an-
other’s recipe identically.197  That being said, copying happens.198  For
example, Chef Robin Wickens came and studied at Alinea, Grant Achatz’s
restaurant in Chicago.199  Wickens learned from the best, returned home
to Australia, and immediately began recreating Alinea’s signature
dishes.200  Wickens did so well that even Chef Achatz had to admit he was
impressed—and furious.201  The terms food forgery and plagiarism de-
scribe what Wickens did, but Achatz had few rights he could enforce
against Wickens.202  Despite this, Achatz still is not in favor of relying on
public ordering to protect his life’s work.203
Self-regulation works well in this environment and, when coupled
with copyright law, promotes equally the interests of all parties.  Thus, leg-
islatures need to closely examine contracts to determine whether they
abide by industry standards.  If not, legislators must decide whether the
contracts circumvent protections offered by the copyright system by frus-
trating the first sale doctrine and preventing flow of employees and infor-
mation necessary for innovations in the culinary arts.
D. Apples
Agrobiotechnology is protected by a vast array of private and publicly
ordered regulations.  The PVPA, plant patents, utility patents, and trade-
marks all play a valuable role in the promotion of innovation in the fields
accomplished chefs, one type of opportunity to make such a decision occurs when
colleagues working in other restaurants request specific items of recipe-related in-
formation. . . .  Of the chefs in our sample, 90% report being asked for such infor-
mation at least once in the past year, and 28% report being asked at least six
times.”).
197. Id. at 192–94.
198. It is worth noting that copying happens often enough that culinary trade
associations promulgate internal regulations stating that members should respect
the intellectual property of other members and not copy recipes. See J. Austin
Broussard, An Intellectual Property Food Fight: Why Copyright Law Should Embrace Culi-
nary Innovation, 10 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 691, 709 (2008) (“[T]he International
Association of Culinary Professionals, a 4,000 member, non-profit organization of
individuals ‘engaged in the areas of culinary education, communication, or in the
preparation of food and drink,’ expects its members to ‘[r]espect the intellectual
property rights of others and not knowingly use or appropriate to [one’s] own
financial or professional advantage any recipe or other intellectual property be-
longing to another without the proper recognition.’  Likewise, the United States
Personal Chef Association instructs its members, who prepare in-home meals for
clients, ‘[t]o respect the intellectual property of [one’s] peers by not copying, re-
producing or in any other way utilizing their written or published materials as
[one’s] own, even when this work has not been explicitly protected by copyright,
patent, etc.’” (footnote omitted) (second, third, fourth, and fifth alterations in
original)).
199. Fauchart & von Hippel, supra note 196.
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and orchards.204  If licenses reinforce publicly ordered protections, they
give agricultural innovators greater control over plant variety than the in-
tellectual property system alone would allow and enhance economic
value.205  Grafting private ordering onto public ordering is proving to be
the foundation of intellectual property innovation in agrobio-
technology.206
In the apple orchard, the concept of a managed apple provides one
lens into controlling a plant variety through public and private ordering.
Star Fruits, a fruit variety license manager, introduced the first managed
apple in 1978.207  The apple itself was not a success, but the idea had
taken seed, and Star Fruits began looking for an apple they could profita-
bly develop, license, and market.208  Investing in the Cripps Pink apple,
Star Fruits branded it as a “Pink Lady” apple and instituted strict require-
ments on the brand, the growing conditions, the distributors, and the
like.209  Star Fruits managed every aspect of the life cycle of the Pink Lady
apple, from where it could be planted to where it could be sold—hence
the name managed apple.  Growers of the “Pink Lady” apple paid a pre-
mium to Star Fruits for the privilege of growing and for Star Fruits’ efforts
to promote the brand.  A grower could grow a Cripps Pink apple without
204. See 7 U.S.C. §§ 2042, 2483 (2018); 35 U.S.C. §§ 101, 161 (2018).
205. In 2020, for instance, grapes could be purchased at the grocery store that
were marked with an End User License Agreement placing the following restric-
tions on recipients of Carnival Brand Grapes: “The recipient of the produce con-
tained in this package agrees not to propagate or reproduce any portion of the
produce, including ‘but not limited to’ seeds, stems, tissue and fruit.”  Matthew
Gault, Proprietary Grapes Come With Draconian End User License Agreement, VICE (Oct.
14, 2020, 9:00 AM), https://www.vice.com/en/article/m7jm4y/proprietary-
grapes-come-with-draconian-end-user-license-agreement [https://perma.cc/3MFJ-
6UK3].
206. Charles, supra note 40 (“There’s an apple renaissance underway, an ever-
expanding array of colors and tastes in the apple section of supermarkets and
farmers markets.  Less visible is the economic machinery that’s helping to drive
this revolution.  An increasing number of these new apples are ‘club apples’—
varieties that are not just patented, but also trademarked and controlled in such a
way that only a select ‘club’ of farmers can sell them.”).
207. Melissa Hansen, The Origin of Club Varieties, GOOD FRUIT GROWER (Nov. 1,
2008), https://www.goodfruit.com/the-origin-of-club-varieties/ [https://
perma.cc/T33A-2WFX].
208. Star Fruits, Pink Lady, A Global Success Story, STAR-FRUITS, https://
www.star-fruits.com/pink-lady-license-manager/a-global-success-story/?lang=en
[https://perma.cc/8UP5-NAYT] (last visited Jan. 31, 2021).
209. The original Pink Lady apple, the Cripps Pink, was first bred by John
Cripps at the Department of Agriculture in Western Australia (DAFWA).  Garry
Langford, The Birth of APAL’s Pink Lady Business, APAL (Mar. 29, 2016), https://
apal.org.au/birth-apals-pink-lady-business/ [permalink unavailable].  DAFWA
went on to create the Pink Lady trademark as well at a time when “the concept of
using a trade mark to protect an apple product was a significant innovation in
[the] industry.” Id.  The trademark was assigned to Australian Apple and Pear
Growers Association (AAPGA), the predecessor to today’s Apple & Pear Australia,
Ltd. (APAL). Id.  APAL remains the Australian Pink Lady trademark holder, and
licenses it to the International Pink Lady Alliance. Id.
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paying Star Fruits but would not benefit from Star Fruits’ investment in
the Pink Lady brand.  Developers of managed apples, like Star Fruits, rely
on trademark law and licenses to impose numerous restrictions on how
these varietals can be grown, marketed, packaged, and processed.210
Today, many popular apples are managed apples,211 including Cos-
mic Crisps, SweeTangos, Zestars, and Envies.212  Furthermore, many of
these managed apples are club apples, a more recent refinement of the
managed apple concept.213  Managed and club apples both restrict the
rights of the growers.  Anyone can license a managed apple, but to grow a
club apple, a farmer must belong to that club.  Members of that club are
licensed to reproduce the club apples, which are often patented and
trademarked.214  The club markets and promotes the apples for which it
controls the licenses.215  Clubs are expensive.216  Club members bear the
costs of growing the apple, of marketing, promoting, and controlling the
apple, and of researching and developing new apple varieties.217  Club
varieties may charge growers a per-tree royalty, a box sales charge, a per
box charge for promotion, and a royalty on apples sold, among other
costs.218  Managed apples are controlled in a similar fashion to club ap-
ples, but growers do not have to belong to a club.  Growers have fewer
rights when growing managed and club varieties than in growing other
210. Washington State University, for instance, prohibits licensed growers
from reselling or otherwise transferring licensed trees to third parties; from plant-
ing the licensed trees outside of the agreed upon licensed territory; or from using
an unlicensed packer or processor to pack and process the licensed apples. WASH.
STATE UNIV., supra note 161.  And the university requires the licensed growers to
take “all reasonable precautions to ensure that no third party obtains budwood or
other propagation materials from the Licensed Trees.” Id.; see also van Zoeren &
Atucha, supra note 26.
211. Growing Produce Staff, Managed Varieties: The Future, GROWINGPRODUCE
(Apr. 21, 2011), https://www.growingproduce.com/fruits/managed-varieties-the-
future/ [https://perma.cc/93NE-74ER] (“Almost all new varieties are now being
introduced under some sort of managed program that hopes to restrict supply.
However, that almost guarantees that none of them will become the next Gala
(that is, a widely available, popular variety).  It also means that their share of apple
supplies will remain below 5% for many years.” (internal quotation marks
omitted)).
212. Abad-Santos, supra note 56.
213. Id.
214. Id.
215. See Geraldine Warner, Study the Pros and Cons of Club Varieties: Would You
Be Better Off Growing a Club Variety with High Returns, or a Less Restricted Variety With
Lower Costs?, GOOD FRUIT GROWER (July 1, 2006), https://www.goodfruit.com/
study-the-pros-and-cons-of-club-varieties/ [https://perma.cc/6AN9-DMEC] (For
instance, one managed apple developer, Enza, “sets a worldwide production target
and then decides who will grow the fruit. The quality of the fruit is controlled, and
there’s a detailed marketing plan.”).
216. Id.
217. Id. (“To Grow Jazz or Pacific Rose, growers pay a $2,000 per-acre fee to
join the club, as well as sales charges and royalties.”).
218. Id.
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non-restricted varietals; but on the other hand, such apples also bring ben-
efits.  Star Fruits, for instance, handles the promotion of the Pink Lady
apple and enforces all restrictions, so the grower simply has to grow the
apple and bring it to market.
The patented SweeTango apple, released in 2009 by the University of
Minnesota, is a club apple.219  Initially labeled as MN 1914, the University
exclusively licensed the SweeTango to “The Next Big Thing,” a growers
cooperative.220  To commercially sell a SweeTango apple, a grower must
bargain for a license with The Next Big Thing.221  Minnesota growers who
are licensed to grow SweeTango apples, but who are not members of The
Next Big Thing cooperative, are limited to private sales of SweeTango ap-
ples to consumers.222  Non-cooperative, non-Minnesota growers cannot li-
cense the trees that grow SweeTango apples.223  The license requires the
grower to pay an annual, per-tree royalty fee to The Next Big Thing.224
There are further limits placed on the number of trees that can be li-
censed and how the fruit can be advertised.225  A license is not a sale.  As a
result, many of the restrictions that accompany sales of trademarked and
patented goods can be circumvented through the contractual language of
the license.  For instance, to grow SweeTango apples, dealers must agree
to grow no more than 1,000 trees and not pool their apples for sale to the
wholesale market.226  If the dealers had purchased the SweeTango apples
outright, then the dealers would be free to distribute the apples as the
dealers wished.  The consortium behind SweeTango pays the University of
219. The SweeTango is covered by U.S Plant Patent No. 18,812 (issued May
13, 2008); see also Alyssa Vance, The Building of a Brand: The SweeTango, HEAVY TA-
BLE (Oct. 14, 2019), http://heavytable.com/the-building-of-an-apple-brand-the-
sweetango/ [https://perma.cc/FD8V-6YL7] (describing the SweeTango and
“buzz” around its creation).
220. Id.
221. A group of Minnesota apple growers sued the University of Minnesota
seeking access to the SweeTango apple without having to go through The Next
Best Thing cooperative.  Arguing that a publicly funded university should not be
able to develop a product and grant an exclusive license to sell that product, the
growers alleged antitrust violations.  They lost the suit.  Matt Milkovich, Litigants
Settle SweeTango Dispute, FRUIT GROWERS NEWS (Nov. 4, 2011), https://fruitgrower-
snews.com/article/litigants-settle-sweetango-dispute/ [https://perma.cc/6V34-
V7WS].
222. See id. (“Minnesota growers who weren’t members of Next Big Thing
could grow [a limited supply of SweeTango apples]. . . provided they only sold the





226. Steve Karnowski, Hot New Apple: SweeTango, Spicy and Sweet, EDGE: S.F.
(Sept. 19, 2010), http://www.edgesanfrancisco.com/index.php?ch=
style&sc=home&sc3=&id=110473 [https://perma.cc/P3JW-2599].
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Minnesota a royalty on the apple’s net wholesale sales and controls the
wholesale market for the SweeTango apple.227
Private ordering has shaped the SweeTango apple’s availability, un-
like its parent—the Honeycrisp apple—which was an open release gov-
erned only by publicly ordered restrictions.228  The Honeycrisp apple is a
tremendously successful brand and one of the University of Minnesota’s
most profitable innovations.  Even so, the temporal limitations on patent
protection limited the university’s profits on the Honeycrisp variety.229  To
maximize profits from a new plant variety, return on the research and
development costs must occur upfront with the sale of the physical plant
itself or be amortized over the plant’s life.230  Farmers have not yet proven
ready to pay all the costs upfront, thus, amortization has to play a role in
the return on research and development necessary.  If an apple tree is
sold, there is a limited time during which the developer can restrict the
rights of the grower under patent law.  For instance, the royalty cost for a
Honeycrisp apple amortized to “less than a penny” over the useful life of
the tree.231
Private ordering gives the university stronger protections for the
SweeTango apple and greater return on its investment.232  Instead of sell-
ing SweeTango scionwood, the university licenses it, using private order-
ing to circumvent public legislation and control the SweeTango brand. By
weaving together licenses and intellectual property protection, the univer-
sity extended its control over the intellectual property embodied in the
SweeTango apple.233  Growers who had purchased the Honeycrisp apple
are now restricted to licensing the SweeTango apple.234  The expiration of
the patent on the Honeycrisp signaled the end of restrictions on
Honeycrisp growers.  But the expiration of the patent on the SweeTango
does not end all restrictions on the licensees of the SweeTango.235  Minne-
227. Id.
228. Ko, supra note 73.
229. Honeycrisp Patent Expiration Not Expected to Change Sales, FRUIT GROWERS
NEWS (Jan. 8, 2008), https://fruitgrowersnews.com/article/honeycrisp-patent-ex-
piration-not-expected-to-change-sales/ [https://perma.cc/9Q2P-KTP8]; Allana
Akhtar, Everybody Loves Honeycrisp Apples—and That’s Why They Are So Expensive, NPR
(Oct. 9, 2015), https://www.michiganradio.org/post/everybody-loves-honeycrisp-
apples-and-thats-why-theyre-so-expensive [https://perma.cc/T8MQ-5AEP]
(“[T]he royalty cost per apple is less than a penny . . . .”).
230. Ashley Wright, What Is America’s Favorite Apple Variety?, FARM FLAVOR
(Sept. 19, 2018), https://www.farmflavor.com/us-agriculture/americas-favorite-ap-
ple-variety/ [https://perma.cc/KBJ7-9KUM].
231. Akhtar, supra note 229.
232. Karnowski, supra note 226.
233. Id.
234. Id.
235. Pamela Parks, The Family Tree to Better Apples, EDIBLE DOOR (Sept. 1,
2013), https://edibledoor.ediblecommunities.com/recipes/honeycrisp-sweetango
-apples [https://perma.cc/EP62-77S7] (“A twist on the typical release,
SweeTango® is not really SweeTango® until the fruit is picked, sorted, and
bagged for sale.  The trees and fruit are technically called “Minneiska.”
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sota should be able to profit from the SweeTango apple—but at what cost
to the public?236  Such circumvention erodes the very foundation of pub-
lic ordering and encourages monopolistic behavior on the part of the
trademark owner.
Many licenses are used to ensure the integrity of the intellectual prop-
erty as distributed to the consumer.  Such licenses often restrict the licen-
see’s use to a geographic region, duration of use, or field of use,
augmenting publicly ordered rights.237  The limits on membership in The
Next Big Thing allows the cooperative to place restrictions on the
SweeTango’s growing conditions.238  This restriction was important to the
University of Minnesota, due to concerns with the open release
Honeycrisp apple.  A Honeycrisp apple seeded in an orchard planted with
Red Delicious apples will take on the characteristics of the Red Delicious
apple, through a phenomenon known as red drift.239  An apple so af-
fected may look like a Honeycrisp but not have the exact taste and charac-
teristics of a Honeycrisp apple.240  Honeycrisp innovators became
concerned that, due to the absence of propagation restrictions, the apples
being sold to consumers as Honeycrisp were not the best representatives
of the brand.241  Licensing the technology allows the innovator to place
planting restrictions within its license terms, manage the apple’s geo-
graphic release, and limit the impact of poor growing conditions, avoiding
SweeTango® is copyrighted and trademarked so when the patent runs out in 17
years, the UM will still have the control over the name and logo, unlike
Honeycrisp.  Growers pay a royalty for each tree planted and every pound of
SweeTango® that is grown.  The managed release is a new approach for apple
growing but is not uncommon in other areas of study.”).
236. See Jacob H. Rooksby, University™ Trademark Rights Accretion in Higher Edu-
cation, 27 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 349, 402 (2014) (“The loss is not necessarily that
exclusive ownership rights should lie with a company instead of with a university.
The loss is that colleges and universities are seeking to control things they never
used to control.  What we as a public once received unfettered, in exchange for the
granting of considerable state and federal research dollars, we now may only re-
ceive with strings attached.”).
237. This is one of the distinctions between licensing a grower and selling a
tree to a grower. See Impression Prods., Inc. v. Lexmark Int’l, Inc., 137 S. Ct. 1523,
1529 (2017); Adams v. Burke, 84 U.S. 453, 456-57 (1873).
238. Milkovich, supra note 221 (“Pepin Heights formed a cooperative called
Next Big Thing, allowing growers in several other states and Canadian provinces to
join. Membership was limited, however, as the cooperative sought to regulate the
ways SweeTango could be grown and marketed.”); Julia Stewart, Building a Better
Apple: Co-Op Pursues Premium Market Niche By Producing, MARKETING NEW VARIETIES,
Sept/Oct. 2015, at 16, http://sweetango.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/10/
ruralcooperatives_septoct2015_nbtarticleonly-1.pdf [https://perma.cc/MQ8P-
TFCM] (stating there are “44 apple growers who are members of ‘Next Big Thing,
A Growers’ Cooperative’”).
239. Seabrook, supra note 72.
240. Id. (“The quality varied widely, and as consumers found they could not
count on the Honeycrisp crunch every time, the brand suffered.  And . . . ‘red
drift’ began to set in. . . .  ‘The wheel is turning again, and one day the red sports
will take over and Honeycrisp will be just as flavorless as the next apple.’”).
241. Id.
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the potential issue of Red Drift that impacted the Honeycrisp.  The Next
Best Thing did so in their licenses, arguably protecting the integrity of the
SweeTango growing experience.242  These licenses also allow the Univer-
sity to profit from sales of the SweeTango long after the patent expires.243
This is an example of a license that both benefits and harms the
consumer.
The managed apple models are not without controversy.244  First,
managed apples are expensive.245  Second, managed apples have a limited
production, making such apples potentially hard to find and difficult to
popularize.246  Third, growers may be reluctant to comply with the de-
tailed requirements and paperwork associated with many managed apple
varieties.247  Fourth, managed varieties emanating from public institutions
have prompted additional concerns about the allocation of public re-
sources.248  Finally, private ordering is new and different, causing head-
aches for growers unfamiliar with the concept.249  Farmers must adjust
and realize they may not be able to grow or sell an apple variety.  This is
despite consumers’ requests for the variety and willingness to pay more for
the apples.250  That being said, managed varieties have found tremendous
success, changing the cultivar and the model of distribution.
242. Milkovich, supra note 221.
243. The University of Minnesota states that “exclusive licensing was necessary
to protect the quality of the SweeTango while maximizing royalties the university
could earn to support future research.”  Karen Herzog, SweeTango at Core of Apple
War: Growers Battle Over Early Season Fruit Developed by University of Minnesota That Is
Produced Under an Exclusive Licensing Agreement, MILWAUKEE-WISCONSIN J. SENTINEL
(Sept. 9, 2010), https://archive.jsonline.com/news/wisconsin/102597659.html/
[https://perma.cc/7EJ3-GLYJ].
244. See George Morgan, Trademark Fight Moves to Apples, MORGAN L. OFF. (July
11, 2012), http://patentaz.com/1143/trademark-fight-moves-to-apples [https://
perma.cc/DF79-QWB8].
245. Abad-Santos, supra note 56.
246. Id.
247. Warner, supra note 215.
248. A group of farmers sued the University of Minnesota seeking to void the
contract signed between the University and Pepin Heights.  Milkovich, supra note
221.  The contract granted Pepin Heights the “exclusive license to grow, have
others grow on its behalf, and sell SweeTango.” Id. (internal quotation marks
omitted).  Pepin then formed The Next Big Thing and released SweeTango as a
managed apple. Id.  The farmers sued, challenging “the idea of a publicly funded
university developing a product and granting an exclusive license to one business
to sell that product.” Id.  The lawsuit argued that using public funds should give
the public the right to benefit from the product, and to do otherwise is illegal and
unethical. Id.  The case settled. Id.
249. Warner, supra note 215 (noting one of the biggest drawbacks to man-
aged apples is the additional paperwork they generate: “Paperwork is a drawback.
‘It’s expensive,’ . . . .  ‘It’s a headache.’  The cost is one of the main
disadvantages.”).
250. Id. (“On the down side, the grower has less control than with traditional
varieties when it comes to deciding how many acres are planted, and the grower
and variety owner might have different motivations . . . .”); David Marks, Jazz Apple
Tree, GARDENFOCUSED, https://www.gardenfocused.co.uk/fruitarticles/apples/vari
42
Submission to Villanova Law Review
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr
2021] BARGAINING FOR INNOVATION 161
Managed apples are a relatively new innovation, but the branding of
apples is not.  Clarence Stark came up with the name “Delicious” for an
apple before even finding just the right apple to bear that appellation.251
Protecting that brand, Clarence Stark found the Golden Delicious apple,
placed physical restraints around the original Golden Delicious tree, and
created a massive marketing campaign focused on the brand itself.252  To-
day, innovators have taken protection to a whole new level through man-
aged and club apples, promoting their brand while limiting the rights of
farmers.253
The MN55 cultivar presents an interesting use of branding in the con-
text of a managed apple.  The University released this managed apple
under two brands—First Kiss, reserved for Minnesota growers, and
Rave,254 exclusively licensed to MN55 cultivar growers outside of Minne-
ety-jazz.php [https://perma.cc/9PMV-XQVN] (last visited Jan. 31, 2021) (“In fact
the Jazz apple tree is known by another name, ‘the lawyer’s apple tree.’  Sad but
that’s the truth.  The promoters of the brand are so protective of the name (just
the name to be clear!) that no-one dares go near it.”).
251. LEANN ZOTTA, 200 YEARS AND GROWING: THE STORY OF STARK BRO’S NUR-
SERIES & ORCHARDS CO. (2016) (“[The apple was a] good-looking apple to be sure,
but it won for its exceptional flavor.  The moment Clarence bit into one, he excit-
edly exclaimed, ‘My! This apple is delicious!’  He paused, thought, and spoke
again.  ‘That will be its name!  Who sent them?’  The judges overwhelming de-
clared the strange-but-delicious apple the winner.  But who had sent the apple?
Chatter rose as the crowd speculated.  To Clarence’s great dismay, it became clear
that no one knew who had sent the prize-winning beauties—the entry card was
missing.  Either the grower had failed to send it, or it had been carelessly lost.  A
frustrating, frantic search failed to bring it to light.”); R. K. Sewell, Page Allotment
Can Make or Break Catalogue: Advertising of Stark’s Golden Delicious Apple Trees Shows
How This Mathematical Principle Works, PRINTERS’ INK MONTHLY, May 1921, http://
129.71.204.160/history/businessandindustry/goldendelicious03.html [https://
perma.cc/KP9C-MYSF].
252. Sewell, supra note 251 (“To protect the tree from vandalism and to pro-
vide a dramatic touch for the advertising that was bound to come later, the com-
pany erected a burglar-proof wire cage around the tree and hired the owner of the
orchard as watchman.  If any attempt is made to get at the tree an electric alarm
rings in the watchman’s cottage.  The tree is a cage, on account of its human-
interest appeal, has been shown on moving-picture screens in thousands of thea-
tres and has been picture[d] widely.”).
253. Managed apples and club apples are two terms often used interchangea-
bly, but in fact, club apples are a subset of managed apples.  A managed apple is a
broader term referring to all apples where restrictions are placed on the apple
growers and the apple is “managed” by a source.  Club apples are a subset of man-
aged apples where growers have to be part of a “club” or a particular group in
order to grow these apples, and the growth of the apple is managed by the group.
Pink Lady is a managed apple, while SweeTango is a club apple.  Charles, supra
note 40.
254. More About the Fruit, STEMLIT WORLD FAMOUS FRUIT, https://www.stemilt.
com/fruits/apples/rave-apples/ [https://perma.cc/8VS4-4RX9] (last visited Jan.
31, 2021); Amy Sowder, Stemlit’s Rave Apple Kicks Off Washington’s 2019 Crop, PMG:
PRODUCT PACKER (July 31, 2019), https://www.producemarketguide.com/article/
stemilts-rave-apple-kicks-washingtons-2019-crop [https://perma.cc/9DHH-GG2L].
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sota.255  These managed apples allow the University of Minnesota to pro-
tect the in-state business while commercializing the apple more broadly
overall.  The brand tells consumers not only the apple variety but also
where the apple is grown, providing valuable information to those looking
to eat local.  This is important information to many consumers.
Managed apples range from the local First Kiss to the international
range of a Pink Lady apple.  For instance, the Jazz apple is controlled by
ENZA,256 which sets a worldwide production target and uses that target to
determine how to license growers.257  By so doing, growers of Jazz have
some protection against overproduction.258  ENZA also has a detailed
marketing plan that is tied to that worldwide production target.259  On the
other hand, every aspect of a licensed grower of a Jazz apple is controlled
by ENZA,260 including how many acres the grower can plant, to what root-
stock the grower can graft the Jazz scionwood, when the Jazz apple can be
harvested, and how densely the apple trees can be planted.261  Even decid-
ing to no longer plant Jazz apples carries additional costs—including be-
ing forced to remove all the controlled trees.262  But managed apples like
the MN55 can provide a higher return for growers, therefore rendering
the apple attractive despite increased growing costs.
Bargaining for innovation takes many forms—from licenses to non-
disclosure agreements to private injunctions.  Such bargaining may benefit
255. This is not the first apple to be so marketed.  The B51 is a grower-devel-
oped descendant of the Honeycrisp apple and is marketed as the B51 in Minne-
sota and the SugarBee outside of Minnesota.  Adam Belz, With First Kiss, University
of Minnesota Apple Growers Find Their Sweet Spot, STAR TRIB. (Sept. 16, 2018, 9:27
AM), https://www.startribune.com/with-first-kiss-university-of-minnesota-apple-
growers-find-their-sweet-spot/493387331/ [https://perma.cc/RM4E-88E6].
256. The Jazz apple was first introduced in 2003 and was an early club variety.
Jazz Apple Promotion Push Set for New Year, BLUE BOOK SERVS. (Dec. 19, 2019), https:/
/www.producebluebook.com/2019/12/19/jazz-apple-promotion-push-set-for-new-
year/# [https://perma.cc/6SRA-26TC#modal].  Jazz is a trademark for the
Scifresh cultivar.  T&G Global, New Zealand Envy & JAZZ Expected to Turn Shopper
Heads, PERISHABLENEWS.COM (May 29, 2020), https://www.perishablenews.com/
produce/new-zealand-envy-jazz-expected-to-turn-shopper-heads/ [https://
perma.cc/DN5V-3N2M].  It is currently covered by U.S. Plant Patent No. 13,888
(issued June 17, 2003), which will expire in 2021.
257. Warner, supra note 215.
258. The success of the Jazz apple is attributed, at least in part, to the “‘consis-
tency and uniqueness’ of the apples’ eating experience, along with the dual hemi-
sphere growing operations that ensure year-round availability.” Jazz Apple Brand
Undergoes Refresh, FRESHFRUITPORTAL.COM (Feb. 9, 2017), https://www.freshfruit
portal.com/news/2017/02/09/jazz-apple-brand-undergoes-refresh/ [https://
perma.cc/S6PB-Y9JW].
259. Warner, supra note 215.
260. ENZA is a club based out of New Zealand that manages the Jazz apple
internationally—including in Washington, the only location Jazz apples are li-
censed to grow in the United States.  Jazz apples are also grown in Chile and New
Zealand.  Charles, supra note 40.
261. Warner, supra note 215.
262. Id.
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the parties, while also throwing up significant roadblocks to researchers,
chefs, or innovators seeking to change labs, restaurants, or positions.  The
public’s interest in accessing innovation, promoting disclosure, and lower-
ing the barriers to entry must be considered as the shift from public order-
ing to private ordering takes place.  Private parties are often unaware of
the rights they are giving up for access to the innovations, and that repre-
sents a loss to the public as well.  There are reasons to supplement public
ordering, and in some industries such as comedy, private ordering is work-
ing well.  In other industries, such as software, private ordering needs to
be closely examined to see if the public interest is being undermined by
licenses that circumvent restrictions inherent in our intellectual property
system.
III. INNOVATION INCENTIVE AND INSTITUTIONAL CHOICE
The publicly ordered set of rights available to innovators within the
United States is diverse, broad in scope, and protective of the public’s in-
terest.  Private ordering supplements and supplants private ordering, re-
flecting market demand and highlighting those areas where the market is
broken.263  There is a keen public interest in promoting disclosure of
novel ideas, and that public interest is promulgated through public order-
ing; however, not all innovation is adequately protected through public
ordering.  Private ordering must play a significant role if innovation is to
continue and the public is to benefit from those innovations.  At the same
time, Congress and the courts must place restrictions on private ordering’s
scope.  A balance must be struck between frustrating public interest and
favoring the freedom to contract.  Without the thoughtful extension of
intellectual property principles into the domain of licenses, the balance
between intellectual property owner’s rights and the public interest in in-
tellectual property will shift away from the public interest.
A careful reevaluation of public and private ordering is necessary to
protect the public’s interest and promote innovation.  Fundamental
changes are required.  Clarity must be codified, limitations must be liti-
gated, and self-regulation must be restricted.  It is important to question
263. See, e.g., Michael Andor Brodeur, Copyright Bots and Classical Musicians Are
Fighting Online.  The Bots Are Winning, WASH. POST (May 21, 2020, 8:00 AM), https:/
/www.washingtonpost.com/entertainment/music/copyright-bots-and-classical-mu-
sicians-are-fighting-online-the-bots-are-winning/2020/05/20/a11e349c-98ae-11ea-
89fd-28fb313d1886_story.html [https://perma.cc/XJ94-VKTN] (explaining classi-
cal musicians are discovering that automated copyright infringement bots are not
terrific at differentiating between pieces that infringe a current copyright and law-
ful musical variations); Ari Herstand, ASCAP, BMI and SESAC Force Local Coffee Shop
to Shut Down Live Music, DIGITAL MUSIC NEWS (Oct. 29, 2014), https://
www.digitalmusicnews.com/2014/10/29/ascap-bmi-sesac-force-local-coffee-shop-
shut-live-music/ [permalink unavailable] (explaining how a small coffee shop
hosted concerts and found that the costs of licensing the music for live concerts far
outweighed the benefits to the shop).  New markets are being formed by these
broken aspects of the current market.
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institutional choice264 on an art-by-art basis; in some fields, such as com-
edy, the adjudicative process is too expensive and too slow, while self-regu-
lation is better suited to protect comics than other options.  However,
when innovators are making that choice, the public interest loses its seat at
the table.
The coexistence of public and private ordering shows that neither
alternative is perfect.  In each art, there are advantages and disadvantages
to choosing self-regulation, legislation, common law, or private ordering.
At a minimum, Congress and the courts must evaluate the public’s interest
in a particular field of innovation, as well as an innovator’s potential inter-
est.  The question of how to address a broken market where innovation
and publicly ordered protection do not fit perfectly together makes the
solution complicated.  However, it is a question that must be addressed in
a timely fashion.  There are times when licenses are being used to aug-
ment intellectual property protection in the consumer’s interest.265  On
the other hand, there are times when licenses are used to prevent compet-
itors from accessing technology after a patent term ends, taking away
rights the competitors are entitled to under the law.266  Such a license
should not be enforced.267  Differentiating between these scenarios is dif-
ficult and requires careful consideration of the economic realities, the im-
perfect institutional choices available, the norms controlling individual
industries, and the interests of the innovator and the public.
Litigating and legislating public ordering will allow innovators to
make a more informed choice about which institution to rely on for the
protection of their innovation—public ordering or private ordering.  Pro-
tection of the useful arts through patent law requires an understanding of
what it means to be useful.  Allowing brands to acquire trademark protec-
tion requires the courts to delineate the difference between a brand that
identifies the product and one that identifies the source.  Rendering a
sculpture edible does not eliminate its copyright protection—artists are
entitled to protection for the fixed expression of their ideas.  Eliminating
these ambiguities will allow the system to better protect both public inter-
est and promote innovation.
264. See generally KOMESAR, supra note 16.
265. One example is the First Kiss/Rave apple brands.  Consumers who
choose to buy local can use that name as a shortcut for buying local.  By trademark-
ing the name and policing the trademark users, the University of Minnesota is
supplementing the public ordering in a beneficial fashion for all. See First Kiss®
and Rave® , UNIV. MINN., https://mnhardy.umn.edu/varieties/fruit/apples/
ravefirst-kiss [https://perma.cc/5DYV-3EQC] (last visited Feb. 12, 2021); Belz,
supra note 255.
266. See discussion infra about the MAIA-1 apple in Section III.C.1 (Patenting
Brands).
267. In a different field, legislation was proposed to render licenses unen-
forceable that sought to extend copyright law beyond the scope envisioned by leg-
islators.  The Digital Era Copyright Enhancement Act, H.R. 3048, 105th Cong.
(1997).
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A. Codifying Clarifications
There is a strong public policy incentive in promoting innovation
through public ordering.  Codifying reward, however, is inherently diffi-
cult, and the effort often results in ambiguities and loopholes.  The con-
flict arises at the intersection of protecting the public’s interest and the
self-interest of those involved in seeking legislative initiatives.  Innovators
pushing for greater reward may seek to change the laws, but in doing so
may harm the public interest.  Patent law provides one such example of
this concern.  One of the questions to be addressed in analyzing efforts to
legislate innovation is what parties are driving that legislation.268  There
are real concerns about the impact of interest groups in politics.269
Not all innovations are patent-eligible.270  Title 35, Section 101 of the
U.S. Code, entitled “Inventions patentable,” lists the broad categories of
patent-eligible subject matter, but it does not delineate the judicially cre-
ated limitations on patent eligibility.  Invention itself is defined in Title 35,
Section 100 as an “invention or discovery,” again with no further elucida-
tion.271  The current diminished level of clarity as to what is patent eligible
yields unpredictable results, leaving patentees, potential infringers, and in-
vestors uncertain as to whether a patent issued today will be enforceable
tomorrow.272  This is as true for software as it is for hybrid corn.  Following
the lead of the European Patent Convention (EPC) and Japan by codify-
ing the exceptions to patent eligibility for particular inventions would help
inventors understand how to best protect their inventions.273  Legislating
a definition would mirror the approach taken by Japan and the EPC, allow
268. See, e.g., Geoffrey Brennan & James M. Buchanan, Is Public Choice Im-
moral?  The Case for the “Nobel” Lie, 74 VA. L. REV. 179 (1988).
269. See KOMESAR, supra note 16, at 53–97.
270. See Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 185 (1981) (“This Court has un-
doubtedly recognized limits to § 101 and every discovery is not embraced within
the statutory terms.  Excluded from such patent protection are laws of nature, nat-
ural phenomena, and abstract ideas.”).
271. 35 U.S.C. § 100(a) (2018).
272. See, e.g., Walsh, supra note 159, at 294 n.13 (“Some firms have also begun
concentrating on their most promising targets, because of the high cost of main-
taining patents and the low value of many . . . patents . . . that may not give rights
to downstream developments.”).
273. In addition to the codified exceptions, the Japanese patent examiners
have a detailed list given to them of non-statutory inventions which are not patent-
eligible.  These guidelines contain a detailed list of excluded inventions.  Under
these guidelines, the excluded categories are not a “creation of a technical idea
utilizing the laws of nature” and are, therefore, not statutory inventions. JAPAN
PATENT OFFICE, EXAMINATION GUIDELINES FOR PATENT AND UTILITY MODEL IN JAPAN
pt. III, ch. 1, § 2.1 (2015), https://www.jpo.go.jp/e/system/laws/rule/guideline/
patent/tukujitu_kijun/document/index/all_e.pdf [https://perma.cc/7TLJ-
VD4J].  In a similar fashion, the guidelines issued to United States patent examin-
ers state that “claims directed to nothing more than abstract ideas (such as mathe-
matical algorithms), natural phenomena, and laws of nature are not eligible for
patent protection.” U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, MANUAL OF PATENT EXAM-
INING PROCEDURE § 2106.04 (2018).
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the United States to codify the guidelines set forth for U.S. patent examin-
ers, and provide clarification to innovators.274
In choosing to turn to legislation to fix the imperfection in the mar-
ket, an institutional choice is being made.  A patent is a bargain whereby
the public grants the inventor a limited set of rights in return for learning
the intimate details of the invention.  With the constantly shifting back-
ground of patent eligibility, and the substantial cost of obtaining a pat-
ent—both monetary and informational costs—many information age
innovators are choosing to find other ways to protect their ideas and re-
moving the benefit from the public granted by the patent system.  The
government should not be the automatic responder to imperfections in
the market, however, amending Section 101 allows innovators to know
whether their inventions fall within the realm of patent-eligible subject
matter and maximizes economic efficiency.  It is far more difficult for the
benefits to outweigh the risks when the innovator is uncertain as to
whether the invention is even eligible for publicly ordered protection.
B. Litigating Legislation
The courts play a tremendously important role in incentivizing inno-
vation.  The laws of our country must be interpreted by the judicial system.
It is difficult to enter into transactions to protect innovations when the
extent of the codified coverage is unknown.  Courts have the authority to
delineate the legal definitions and the job of clarifying the coverage of the
laws.  When the law states that a plant variety name cannot be trade-
marked, the judicial system needs to define a plant variety name to include
arbitrary names as well as alphanumeric designations.275  The copyright
274. A proposed framework was set forth for a modified Section 101 by Sena-
tors Coons and Tillis and Representatives Collins, Johnson and Stivers on April 17,
2019.  The framework proposed defining:
[I]n a closed list, exclusive categories of statutory subject matter which
alone should not be eligible for patent protection.  The sole list of exclu-
sions might include the following categories, for example:
• Fundamental scientific principles;
• Products that exist solely and exclusively in nature;
• Pure mathematical formulas;
• Economic or commercial principles;
• Mental activities.
Press Release, Chris Coons, Sens. Coons and Tillis and Reps. Collins, Johnson and




275. See, e.g., Lee Reich, Patents and Trademarks: My Plants Broke the Law, NW.
IND. TIMES, https://www.nwitimes.com/niche/shore/home-and-garden/patents-
and-trademarks-my-plants-broke-the-law/article_9e15d253-f64a-5740-8b1b-
4d7fef335aed.html [https://perma.cc/68SJ-JBGK] (last updated Jan. 7, 2013) (“I
recently learned that three birch trees I planted have broken a rule about patent-
ing and trademarking.  They are Heritage birches.  The variety name under the
patent is Heritage, and the plant was later trademarked Heritage.  That’s a no-no:
a variety and trademark name must be different.”).
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code says that sculptures are protectable but does not say that they cannot
be edible.  To judicially legislate these protections requires no act of Con-
gress and is in the best interest of innovators and the public.  The adjudi-
cative process is a difficult one and has more formal requirements for
participation than the transactional, market-driven approach discussed in
Section III.C.  On the other hand, the adjudicative process has fewer for-
mal requirements than the political approach discussed in Section III.A.
The process is smaller than either individual transactions or the political
process.  The role of the court is to interpret the laws—not to determine
how to best incentivize innovation.  The dynamics of litigation and the
systemic underrepresentation of the public interest limits the role that
courts can play in the balancing act of protecting the public and promot-
ing the progress of science and the useful arts.  Furthermore, high-impact
parties are unlikely to rely on the judicial system to resolve issues of great
import in the intellectual property system.  That being said, innovators
may try to contract around litigation, but when the licensees disagree as to
the meaning of the laws regulating the innovations being licensed, the
courts must delineate the limits of the laws.  Each institutional choice plays
an important role in protecting the rights of the innovators and the pub-
lic, and each brings with it comparative advantages and disadvantages.  No
one institution can substitute for any other institution.  Contracts, Con-
gress, and the courts all play a role in bargaining for innovation.
1. Delineating Description
Plant varieties are unique from a public policy perspective in the field
of intellectual property.  The plant, its progeny, and the intellectual prop-
erty are often the same thing.  Protecting plant varieties is challenging.
Patents, plant patents, plant variety protection certificates, licenses, and
trademarks are all used, and each form of protection brings with it restric-
tions.  Plants take a long time to come to financial fruition, and develop-
ing new cultivars is an expensive and self-limiting process.  Many cultivars
have no financial future and finding the few that do is a time-consuming
process.276  Patent protection and PVP certificates are temporally limited.
Licenses require privity.  Trademarks are valid as long as they are used in
commerce, and trademark infringement does not require privity.277  That
being said, trademarks must do more than merely describe the variety,
and it is time to judicially legislate the limits of trademark protection.
Courts should deny protection when the brand conveys no more informa-
tion than what variety is being grown.
Traditionally, in growing new cultivars, plant varieties are given an
alphanumeric designation.  Market realities are such that when a new
plant variety is developed, it must have a name to be a commercial suc-
276. Seabrook, supra note 72.
277. See 15 U.S.C. § 1051 (2018).
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cess—not just an alphanumeric designation.278  As a result, many varieties
are identified by both an alphanumeric designation and an arbitrary
name.279  When the same plant is commonly known by both an arbitrary
name and an alphanumeric designation, it can be challenging to under-
stand the difference.280  The alphanumeric designation may be the only
designation found on the patent, while the arbitrary brand may be the
only designation found in the press describing the apple.  The Trademark
Manual of Examining Procedure (TMEP)281 makes it clear that varietal
names cannot be trademarked, since “such names do not function as
source indicators.”282  The TMEP advises examining attorneys to focus on
whether the name sought to be registered describes a particular plant or a
particular source for the plant—in other words, is the term the product or
278. When Washington State University first introduced their WA 2 apple,
they did not give it an arbitrary name.  The apple was subsequently relaunched
and branded as “Sunrise Magic.”  Washington State University expected that “[t]he
name and marketing strategy [would] . . . give the apple the commercial momen-
tum it needs to be commercially successful.” WSU’s WA 2 Apple Will Be Re-Launched
and Marketed As Sunrise Magic: Some Had Called It Crimson Delight, GOOD FRUIT
GROWER (Feb. 9, 2016), https://www.goodfruit.com/wsus-wa-2-apple-will-be-mar-
keted-as-sunrise-magic/ [https://perma.cc/T2YE-UGYY]; see also Marks, supra note
250 (“[T]here is no such thing as a Jazz apple tree variety, that is total hype.  There
is an apple tree called Scifresh, which is the true variety name, but Jazz sounds so
much more . . . well, jazzy, compared to Scifresh doesn’t it?  And with that in mind,
you simply have to know that you are being sold a marketer’s dream with Jazz,
because if they were telling it straight, they would tell you the truth, you are eating
a Scifresh apple, it’s that simple.”); Sunrise Magic Name, PROVARMANAGMENT,
https://provarmanagement.com/sunrise-magic/ [https://perma.cc/AN6K-
R8GC] (last visited Jan. 31, 2021) (“Notably, in two separate consumer focus
groups, the word “Sunrise” was chosen as the preferred brand name for the WA 2
apple variety for the exact same reasons.  Consumers thought that Sunrise was a
good fit because of the beautiful glowing color of the fruit, as well as the light,
refreshing taste that made them think of having a nourishing start to their day.”).
279. See, e.g., In re Hilltop Orchards & Nurseries, Inc., 206 U.S.P.Q. 1034, 1035
(T.T.A.B. 1979) (“Every type of tree or plant in the vegetable kingdom has a speci-
fied generic (Latin) name, generally known only to those scientists well versed in
the botanical community, and entirely unknown to the average purchaser in the
marketplace where such products are sold.”).
280. See generally S.K. Brown & K.E. Maloney, Making Sense of New Apple Vari-
eties, Trademarks and Clubs: Current Status, N.Y. FRUIT Q., Fall 2009, at 9.
281. “While the TMEP does not have the force and effect of law, it sets forth
the guidelines and procedures followed by the examining attorneys at the PTO.”
W. Fla. Seafood, Inc. v. Jet Rests., Inc., 31 F.3d 1122, 1127 n.8 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
282. In re Pennington Seed, Inc., 466 F.3d 1053, 1055 (Fed. Cir. 2006); see also
TMEP § 1202.12 (U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE Oct. 2018) (stating an applica-
tion filed to register a mark for live plants requires the examining attorney to “sub-
mit a request to the Trademark Law Library to undertake an independent
investigation of any evidence that would support a refusal to register, using sources
of evidence that are appropriate for the particular goods specified in the
application”).
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the source.283  When an arbitrary name284 is used as an appellation for all
apples that grow from a particular scionwood, not an appellation for ap-
ples grown in a particular orchard, then the arbitrary name is describing
the product and not the source, thus, it cannot be trademarked.285
In 1942, Archibald Watkins patented a rose.286  The rose was not
named in the plant patent, but Watkins distributed it under the name
“Texas Centennial,” which he then sought to trademark.287  The D.C. Cir-
cuit held that to allow a nursery to trademark the brand by which the
consumers had come to know a patented rose variety would be to prolong
the rights of the patentee beyond the patent term, which would place
competitors at an unfair disadvantage.288  The D.C. Circuit went on to
deny registration to the name of the rose variety, finding it unfair “to re-
quire buyers who are indifferent to source, and want merely goods of cer-
tain characteristics, to name a particular source in order to name the
desired characteristics.”289
If the only way a consumer can refer to a product is to use the varietal
name, then the varietal name is merely descriptive, regardless of whether
there is an alphanumeric name associated with the patent application.290
283. In re Pennington Seed, 466 F.3d at 1059.
284. TMEP § 1202.12.  The TMEP recognizes that varietal names can be a
“numeric or alphanumeric code” such as “MN1711” or a fancy or arbitrary name
such as “Honeycrisp.”
285. 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2018) (stating a trademark must be source-
identifying).
286. See U.S. Plant Patent No. 162 (issued Jan. 21, 1936).
287. Walter J. Derenberg, Trade-Marks Ante Portas, 52 YALE L.J. 829, 840 (1943)
(“[T]he owner of a plant patent for a new variety of rose . . . introduced the rose in
commerce.  He had listed it under that name in his catalogues and attributed cer-
tain physical features to this rose in order to distinguish it from other roses.”).
288. Dixie Rose Nursery v. Coe, 131 F.2d 446, 447 (D.C. Cir. 1942).
289. See id.; see also Derenberg, supra note 287, at 840.
290. Van Well and Hilltop Nurseries owned Plant Patent No. 4,839 (the ‘839
patent) entitled “Spur-Type Red Delicious Apple Tree” and trademarks on the
words “Smoothee” and “Scarlet Spur.” See Van Well Nursery, Inc. v. Mony Life Ins.
Co., 421 F. Supp. 2d 1321 (E.D. Wa. 2006); U.S. Plant Patent No. 4,839 (issued
Apr. 20, 1982); SCARLET SPUR, Registration No. 1,952,536; SMOOTHEE, Regis-
tration No. 1,241,362.  A suit was brought against a competitor for plant patent
infringement and trademark infringement. Van Well Nursery, Inc., 421 F. Supp. 2d
at 1324.  As in the Texas Centennial case, the plant carried no name in the ’839
patent application.  When the apple was marketed, the court found, however, that
Scarlet Spur and Smoothee had “undisputedly become known to the relevant pub-
lic to be names of trees descending from the respective patented cultivars rather
than a brand identifier for the source of the trees.” Id. at 1329.  No attempt was
made to clarify that a Scarlet Spur apple was a Snipes cultivar from a particular
orchard.  A trademark must tell others who produced the product—not what the
product is.  If Scarlet Spur is to operate as a trademark, then a consumer seeing
the “Scarlet Spur” brand, must thus know that the branded apple was the Snipes
cultivar of the Red Delicious apple grown by or licensed from one particular
source.  If upon seeing the “Scarlet Spur” brand, the consumer knows only that
this apple is the Snipes cultivar of the Red Delicious apple, then the brand is not a
trademark, as it is only telling the consumer what type of apple it is, not who grew
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In applying to patent the Honeycrisp apple, the cultivar sought to be pat-
ented was named “Honeycrisp.”291  In patenting the Cosmic Crisp apple,
on the other hand, the varietal name was given as “WA 38.”292  The fact
that Plant Patent No. 24,210 refers to the variety as WA 38, and not “Cos-
mic Crisp,” should not be the determining factor for the trademarkability
of Cosmic Crisp.293  Archibald Watkins used no name in his patent on the
Texas Centennial rose, and yet the D.C. Circuit still understood that the
plant and the arbitrary name were the same.294  Public policy dictates that
trademark law protects source-identifying information for the consumer—
and not terms used merely to describe a product—whether the term de-
scribes the product in a catalog or a patent application.295  When the arbi-
trary name conveys no more information to the consumer than the
alphanumeric designation, then the arbitrary name is not serving as a
trademark, but rather as a description of the product, and the consumer is
harmed by private ordering that restricts the use of the arbitrary name.296
it.  A varietal designation cannot be trademarked.  As a result, the names Scarlet
Spur and Smoothee were found to be generic and not trademarkable. Id. at 1332.
291. U.S. Plant Patent No. 7,917 (issued Mar. 20, 1990); see also Kate Krader
Bloomberg, The Search for the Next Honeycrisp Apple, BLOOMBERG (Jan. 2, 2019, 5:12
AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/features/2018-12-14/the-search-for-the-
next-honeycrisp-apple [https://perma.cc/N9K5-86W8]; Dan Olson, Honeycrisp Ap-
ple Losing Its Patent Protection, but Not Its Appeal, MPR NEWS (Oct. 21, 2007, 4:00
AM), https://www.mprnews.org/story/2007/10/11/honeycrisp [https://
perma.cc/B77M-EBEW] (“What about the name, Honeycrisp?  Is it protected?
University of Minnesota officials say they aren’t sure.  The name is trademarked by
the U of M.  One view is that means growers tinkering with variations will have to
pay a trademark license fee or find another name.  Another view is the name is not
protected and can be used by anyone, an opinion which may fuel a future legal
spat.”).  The University of Minnesota initially filed for a trademark on the brand
Honeycrisp, otherwise known as the MN1711 varietal.  The application was aban-
doned, as the Honeycrisp name is associated with the third-most grown variety of
apple in America—not with a particular orchard.
292. U.S. Plant Patent No. 24,210 (issued Feb. 4, 2014).
293. In writing about the Cosmic Crisp, one author demonstrated the confu-
sion by describing the variety as having changed its name from WA 38 to the Cos-
mic Crisp. See Keith Spencer, The Cosmic Crisp Is Not the Future, SALON (Dec. 29,
2019, 7:00 PM), https://www.salon.com/2019/12/29/the-cosmic-crisp-apple-is-
not-the-future/ [https://perma.cc/ZT3S-KD9U] (“The Cosmic Crisp, then known
as WA 38 . . . .”).
294. Dixie Rose Nursery, 131 F.2d at 447.
295. See, e.g., Goodyear’s Rubber Mfg. Co. v. Goodyear Rubber Co., 128 U.S.
598, 602 (1888) (“Names which are thus descriptive of a class of goods cannot be
exclusively appropriated by any one.”); BellSouth Corp. v. DataNational Corp., 60
F.3d 1565, 1569 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (noting the generic name of a product “cannot
inform the public that the product has a particular source”); In re Pennington
Seed, Inc., 466 F.3d 1053, 1059 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (“It is well-established that an
applicant cannot acquire trademark protection for the generic name of a prod-
uct.”); Weiss Noodle Co. v. Golden Cracknel & Specialty Co., 48 C.C.P.A. 1004
(1961) (“[N]o one can be granted the exclusive use of the name of an article
. . . .”).
296. See In re Cooper, 254 F.2d 611, 616 (C.C.P.A. 1958).
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Once a consumer identifies the brand with the product (e.g., the ap-
ple), as opposed to the source (e.g., the source the nursery growing the
apple), then the brand becomes merely descriptive of the product.297  To
find otherwise, and to allow the breeder to continue to control the variety
by controlling its name after the limited rights accorded to the breeder
expire, is to extend those rights beyond their publicly ordered life.  The
consumer must have a name that the consumer can use to ask for a partic-
ular product, and that name is naturally going to be the varietal name.298
To restrict the use of the consumer-recognized name is to harm the bar-
gaining process for the consumer who does not recognize the difference
between a brand and a varietal name.299
In asking for a Coca-Cola, the consumer is asking for a product—a
cola—from a particular source: Coca-Cola.300  On the other hand, in ask-
ing for a Honeycrisp apple at the grocery store, the consumer is asking for
a product—the Honeycrisp apple—not a product from a particular
breeder, orchard, or geographic location.301  Despite this, developers of
new varietals are trademarking the brands used to identify those new
varietals.  Allowing a brand to be used to limit consumer access to a prod-
uct, not a producer, harms the public interest.  It is “unfair to require
buyers who are indifferent to source, and want merely goods of certain
characteristics, to name a particular source in order to name the desired
characteristics.”302  A patent gives the developer the right to exclude
others—a trademark brings with it a different set of rights.  A consumer
seeking to buy a Honeycrisp apple would like an apple with a particular
taste, color, and genetic composition, but the consumer is unlikely to care
297. See In re Farmer Seed & Nursery Co., 137 U.S.P.Q. 231, 231 (T.T.A.B.
1963) (“It has been consistently held that a term which functions as a name of the
goods is inherently incapable of also serving as a trademark to distinguish said
goods in commerce.”); see also In re Cohn Bodger & Sons Co., 122 U.S.P.Q. 345
(T.T.A.B. 1959) (“The catalog shows clearly that . . . ‘BLUE LUSTRE’ is the varietal
name designating a hybrid petunia of a specific variety and color rather than a
brand-name identifying seeds sold only by applicant and distinguishing them from
seeds sold by others.  The varietal name is available to all who grow the variety and
sell the seeds therefrom to describe the particular hybrid petunia.  The term
‘BLUE LUSTRE’ is not a trademark.”).
298. In re Hilltop Orchards & Nurseries, Inc., 206 U.S.P.Q. 1034, 1035
(T.T.A.B. 1979).
299. See id.; Weiss Noodle Co., 290 F.2d at 848 (“[T]he descriptive name of a
product is unregistrable regardless of acquired secondary meaning.”).
300. The Coca-Cola recipe is an example of one of the most famous trade
secrets in the world. See, e.g., Robert M. M. Seto, A Federal Judge’s View of the Most
Important Changes in Patent Law in Half-A-Century, 11 J. TECH. L. & POL’Y 141, 153
(2006).
301. See, e.g., John Ewolt, Why are Honeycrisp Apples Still So Expensive?, STAR
TRIB. (Sept. 27, 2019, 10:35 AM), https://www.startribune.com/why-are-
honeycrisp-apples-still-so-expensive/547544271/ [https://perma.cc/TZC7-NR6V]
(“[M]ore farmers planted Honeycrisp trees and expanded the supplies.  Supplies
have greatly expanded, nearly doubling production in just the last four years.”).
302. Dixie Rose Nursery, 131 F.2d at 447.
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about obtaining a Honeycrisp apple that has been licensed by the Univer-
sity of Minnesota.
It is time to protect the public interest in knowing the difference be-
tween a product and a source.  When a brand communicates information
to the consumer, such as the source of the product, geographic or other-
wise, or information about how the apple is grown, then the brand ought
to be protectable under trademark law.  The brand cannot be protected
under trademark law when the brand conveys nothing more than the
product identification to the consumer.
Innovators in the agribiotechnology field have effectively used brands
to convey information beyond the plant variety to consumers.  A consumer
who wishes to buy local, for instance, may choose to purchase the First Kiss
apple, a trademark used by the University of Minnesota for the MN55 vari-
etal exclusively for apples grown in Minnesota.303  Another brand, Pink
Lady, is a trademark that may be found on several varieties of apples.304
The International Pink Lady Alliance (IPLA) relies heavily on private or-
dering to ensure the limited distribution of apples labeled Pink Lady.
Each grower licensed to grow Pink Lady apples must meet guidelines set
forth by the owner of the mark.305  Pink Lady does not merely describe a
particular apple variety from any source; instead, it refers to the managed
apples produced by licensed Pink Lady growers.306  The purchaser of a
Pink Lady-branded apple is purchasing an apple that meets specific stan-
dards and comes from a licensed source.307  Brands such as Pink Lady or
Rave provide information to the consumer and are entitled to trademark
protection—they do more than merely describe the product.
This is a narrow line, but one worthy of demarcation.308  The public
must have the right to freely use language that describes a product.309  If
303. University of Minnesota Introduces First Kiss Apple, GOOD FRUIT GROWER
(Aug. 8, 2018),  https://www.goodfruit.com/university-of-minnesota-introduces-
first-kiss-apple/ [https://perma.cc/PK45-ESNC].
304. Cripps Pink vs Pink Lady Apples, EARL’S ORGANIC PRODUCE (Jan. 17, 2013),
https://www.earlsorganic.com/2013/01/ [https://perma.cc/TVV4-59PJ]; Walker,
supra note 127.
305. About Pink Lady Brand, PINK LADY AM., https://pinkladyapples.com/ex-
porters-hub/pink-lady-taste-quality-standards/ [https://perma.cc/9SVB-4UVP]
(last visited Jan. 21, 2021).
306. Joanna Blythman, The Jazz Apple: A Privatisation of Nature, GROCER, July
13, 2013, at 21.
307. See id.
308. See Ross-Whitney Corp. v. Smith Kline & French Labs., 207 F.2d 190,
194–95 (9th Cir. 1953) (“When a new product or machine is patented and then
marketed for the duration of patent under a particular name, if the consumer so
identifies the name with the article itself, without regard to the source of its manu-
facture, that name may become the generic designation of the product and as such
enters the public domain along with patent at the end of protected period. . . .
[But,] to extent that given name is identified in the mind of consumer with the
source of the product, the name may be protected.” (footnotes omitted)).
309. That being said, if a mark does convey additional information to a con-
sumer, then even if it is an alphanumeric designation it may be registrable as a
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the plant variety name, such as Honeycrisp, is the only term the consumer
has to describe the exact apple the consumer wants—then the term is
merely describing the characteristics of the apple the consumer seeks to
buy, not describing any characteristics associated with the apple.310  A con-
sumer seeking to buy a Pink Lady apple may purchase a Cripps Pink apple
instead, but if they choose to purchase the Pink Lady apple, they do so
knowing that the Cripps Pink apple branded as a Pink Lady is grown by a
licensed apple farmer under controlled growing conditions.  The variety
name may be arbitrary, but in the case of the Pink Lady apple, the name
conveys information describing the goods being sold to the consumer.311
Experience has proven that alphanumeric marks do not enhance an ap-
ple’s market presence.  If a varietal name is merely descriptive, then the
varietal name is already not registerable.  However, the confusion cur-
rently reigning renders it imperative that it be spelled out by the courts
that a mark that is merely descriptive of a plant variety is not protectable.
The limitations must be judicially legislated.
trademark. See, e.g., Ex parte Pfister Hybrid Corn Co., 56 U.S.P.Q. 275, 275 (Com’r
Pat. & Trademarks 1943) (allowing registration of the number “5897” as a mark
for seed corn).
310. See In re Cooper, 254 F.2d 611, 615 (C.C.P.A. 1958).
311. The Federal Seed Act sets forth numerous seed variety naming restric-
tions and states: “Seed shall not be advertised under a trademark or brand name in
any manner that may create the impression that the trademark or brand name is a
variety name.”  7 U.S.C. § 201.36b(e) (2018).  The guidelines issued by the United
States Department of Agriculture for naming varieties of seed in compliance with
the Federal Seed Act state:
• Variety names may contain trademarks, but the trademark status is
lost in the sense that anyone marketing seed of that variety must use
the entire variety name including the trademark.
• A trademark symbol or registered trademark symbol cannot be dis-
played in the variety name.
• A trademark by itself cannot be a variety name and a variety name
cannot be trademarked.
Variety Naming Guidelines to Comply with the Federal Seed Act, USDA.GOV, https://
www.ams.usda.gov/rules-regulations/fsa/variety-naming [https://perma.cc/4LVB-
FLPT] (last visited Feb. 24, 2021).
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2. Copyrighting the Culinary Arts
Fitting recipes and dishes into the copyright system is not a natural
fit.312  However, food can be art—and art is copyrightable.313  Recipes are
a description of a process, but a description that disseminates an artist’s
knowledge.314  Amending the copyright code can provide publicly or-
dered protection for food, but if this is done, then serious consideration
must be given to inculcating this into the current restaurant culture.315
That being said, the copyright code does not have to be amended to rec-
ognize the protectability of either recipes or edible sculptures.  Judicial
recognition of the copyrightability of recipes and food as art would re-
move any questions respecting these issues.
A copyright protects the idea, not the fixed embodiment of the
idea—the fixed embodiment is merely a way of identifying what the intel-
lectual property sought to be protected is.316  Copyrighting a recipe pro-
tects the fixed representation of the dish consumed by those who make
the recipe—not merely the list of ingredients and the process of making
it.317  All copyrighted material must be original—so there is no concern
about copyright on Thomas Keller’s Simple Roast Chicken impinging on
312. A recipe is a description of a process or a procedure, which the Copy-
right code explicitly exempts from copyright protection.  17 U.S.C. § 102(b)
(2018).  The Copyright Office states: “A mere listing of ingredients is not pro-
tected under copyright law.”  U.S. Copyright Office, What Does Copyright Protect?,
COPYRIGHT.GOV, https://copyright.gov/help/faq/faq-protect.html#recipe [https:/
/perma.cc/DBK4-X9TM] (last visited Jan. 31, 2021); see also U.S. COPYRIGHT OF-
FICE, CIRCULAR 33: WORKS NOT PROTECTED BY COPYRIGHT (2017), https://
www.copyright.gov/circs/circ33.pdf [https://perma.cc/NN65-QS5R]; Publ’ns
Int’l, Ltd. v. Meredith Corp., 88 F.3d 473, 480 (7th Cir. 1996) (“We do not view the
functional listing of ingredients as original within the meaning of the Copyright
Act.”).
313. See 17 U.S.C. § 102(a)(5) (“Copyright protection subsists . . . in pictorial,
graphic and sculptural works . . . .”).
314. Despite this, the Seventh Circuit has held:
The identification of ingredients necessary for the preparation of each
dish is a statement of facts.  There is no expressive element in each list-
ing; in other words, the author who wrote down the ingredients for ‘Cur-
ried Turkey and Peanut Salad’ was not giving literary expression to his
individual creative labors.  Instead, he was writing down an idea, namely,
the ingredients necessary to the preparation of a particular dish.
Publ’ns Int’l Ltd., 88 F.3d at 480.
315. See, e.g., Buccafusco, supra note 140 (“[M]ost chefs would not prosecute
their rights if they had them, if for no other reason than that the time and money
required to pursue these prosecutions would distract the chefs from their work.
To the extent that suits were to be filed for copyright infringement of dishes, they
would likely be . . . brought by large publishing houses that own the rights to the
recipes contained in cookbooks.  Moreover, chefs could find themselves in trouble
with their own publishers and restaurant owners if they sold the rights to the reci-
pes to them.”).
316. See, e.g., Broussard, supra note 198, at 704.
317. Id.
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the ability of a home chef to roast a chicken.318  On the other hand,
Thomas Keller’s signature dish, Beets and Leeks, presents true originality,
and Keller ought to be able to copyright the dish and perhaps prevent a
home chef from recreating it.319  That being said, given the more than
twenty different cooking techniques required to plate this dish, there are
other barriers besides copyright law to the reproduction of this dish by a
home chef.320  It is worth repeating that the reason for protecting the
recipe is to protect the implementation of the recipe by others in a dish—
not the simple words on the paper.321
Unique dishes—such as Cantu’s cotton candy paper—are sculptures
and copyright law should be held by the courts to cover such.322  Copy-
right protection has built-in limitations—the work must be original to be
protected—so replicating a trend would not render the food eligible for
copyright protection.  Furthermore, if another’s work was independently
created, then even if it is identical, the creator has not committed copy-
right infringement.323  And again, if the edible work is inspired by—but
sufficiently different from—the copyrighted work, there is no infringe-
ment.  For instance, if a chef copyrights a cigar sculpture made from sushi,
and a different chef creates an edible sculpture made from roast pork, it
will be challenging to argue that copyright infringement has occurred.324
Judicially legislating copyright protection for edible works of art
would provide stronger protection for those engaged in the culinary arts
318. See Thomas Keller, My Favorite Simple Roast Chicken, BOUCHON (Oct.
2004), https://www.epicurious.com/recipes/food/views/my-favorite-simple-roast-
chicken-231348 [https://perma.cc/NJD4-LQQ4].
319. The ingredients for Beets and Leeks are not unusual or complicated—
including beets, leeks, eggs, and salt—it is the twenty cooking styles, the presenta-
tion, and the experience that render this experience original and protectable.  Pa-
olo Lucchesi, Deconstructing One Signature French Laundry Dish: Dozens of Steps




321. See, e.g., Buccafusco, supra note 140, at 1135 (“The dishes that chefs cre-
ate express various ideas and emotions taken from both the purely culinary world
and the chefs’ wider experiences.”).
322. See generally Lauren Matthews, Trend Spotted: 7 Hors D’Oeuvres That Look
Like Cigars, BIZBASH (July 16, 2012), https://www.bizbash.com/catering/media-
gallery/13479180/trend-spotted-7-hors-doeuvres-that-look-like-cigars [https://
perma.cc/5QLB-JDSN].
323. Skidmore as Tr. for Randy Craig Wolfe Tr. v. Led Zeppelin, 952 F.3d
1051, 1064 (9th Cir. 2020) (“[I]ndependent creation is a complete defense to cop-
yright infringement.”).
324. In one dispute over a recipe for a chicken salad sandwich, the Eastern
District of Ohio pointed out differences between the two recipes such as the use of
“mozzarella cheese instead of provolone” to “demonstrate[ ] that the food items
served by defendants are different from those offered by plaintiffs.  Certainly, plain-
tiffs cannot be suggesting that somehow the copyright prevents defendants from
serving chicken salad sandwiches.”  Tomaydo-Tomahhdo, LLC v. Vozary, 113
U.S.P.Q.2d 1695, 1698 (E.D. Ohio 2015).
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and decrease the need for reliance on private ordering.  There are many
areas of innovation where public ordering is a poor fit for the promotion
of progress.  The public’s interest in mandatory disclosure is often out-
weighed by the innovator’s interest in protecting their innovation in an
uncertain area or maximizing the return on their investment in research
and development.  When public ordering is not designed to protect the
innovation in question, enhancement of protection is needed.  That en-
hancement, at least in the culinary arts, can come straight from the courts.
A sculpture, edible or not, is entitled to protection under the current cop-
yright laws.
C. Limiting Licenses
Innovators are increasingly using contracts to undermine the public
interest inherent in the limitations placed on public ordering.325  Licenses
are a tremendously powerful form of protection, incentivizing innovation
in fields not well protected by public ordering, and serving a parallel func-
tion to the political process discussed above.  But, when private ordering
supplants public ordering and circumvents the statutory limitations, it vio-
lates public policy.  Private ordering may be grafted onto public ordering
to augment protection or to circumvent the public’s interest.  Courts
should enforce licenses when (1) the terms are bargained for, (2) the
terms are not unexpected, and (3) the terms augment—but do not cir-
cumvent—public legislation.  Contracts are an alternative to government
action, and when they promote efficiency, stability, continuity, and the
public good by allowing parties to make promises that have legal effects,
they should be enforced.
At the same time, contracts may be used to raise barriers to entry, to
enforce private norms, to protect confidentiality, to enhance bargaining
power, or to strip parties’ fundamental rights.326  Taken as a whole, these
transactions have a tremendously differing impact.  Driven by the market
process, many licenses are entered into because public legislation does not
adequately protect intellectual property owners’ rights, while other li-
censes strip away the rights of those with less bargaining power.  When the
market fails, it fails because it is imperfect, not because the market-driven
outcomes are the wrong choice.  There are times when the market success-
fully drives and promotes the public interest and still protects the public
interest.  That is not always the case, though.
325. See, e.g., Winston, supra note 15.
326. See, e.g., Kyle K. Courtney, Libraries Do Not Need Permission to Lend Books:
Fair Use, First Sale, and the Fallacy of the Licensing Culture, KYLECOURTNEY.COM (May
18, 2020), https://kylecourtney.com/2020/05/18/libraries-do-not-need-permis-
sion-fair-use-first-sale-and-the-fallacy-of-permission-culture/ [https://perma.cc/
WTR7-PLY4] (“[L]icenses are eroding away our ownership rights over purchased
materials, and also eviscerating the critical copyright exceptions and rights that
every user, not just libraries, have under copyright.”).
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The use of licenses to augment public ordering fits the traditional
norms driving contract law.  Such licenses are economically efficient, al-
lowing parties to negotiate what restrictions they wish to place on down-
stream use and set the potential outcomes for breach, decreasing the
overall transaction costs in light of the possibility of a future breach.  The
parties can thus use the bargaining process to incentivize innovation.  The
transactional cost to society when licenses circumvent public ordering and
place downstream restrictions on the innovations cannot be measured.  In
those scenarios, the market process is not a beneficial institutional choice,
and the centralizing authority of the court must be brought into play to
limit such licenses.  Whether those restrictions involve tying trademark
rights to patent licenses or placing onerous non-disclosure burdens on
those without bargaining power, such restrictions do not support the tradi-
tional norms of contract law and cannot be enforced.  Undermining the
bargaining process is not economically efficient and betrays the funda-
mental purpose of private ordering.
1. Patenting Brands
A patent is a bargain between the public and the innovator. The inno-
vator receives a right to exclude others from using the innovation for a
limited time, and in return, the public gains full access to the innovation
after the patent expires.  The temporal limitations of patent protection
and the extensive research and development time necessary to produce a
successful agrobiotechnological innovation have proven a poor fit for in-
centivizing innovation in the eyes of many breeders.327  Therefore, innova-
tors are increasingly branding their innovations and tying the trademark
license to the patent license through contracts.
In the apple orchard, for instance, the MAIA-1 cultivar, also known as
the EverCrisp apple, was patented in 2014, having been in development
since 1998.328  The introduction of the cultivar to consumers has been a
slow process.329  Nurseries wishing to grow the EverCrisp apple must join
the Midwest Apple Improvement Association (MAIA) and are then given
327. See, e.g., Nevin Martell, Sweet. Tart. Crunchy: How to Engineer a Better Apple,
NPR: THE SALT (Oct. 9, 2013, 1:11 PM), https://www.npr.org/sections/thesalt/
2013/10/08/230552146/sweet-tart-crunchy-how-to-engineer-a-better-apple
[https://perma.cc/HGF9-4LR7] (“It took her most of her professional career to
develop these two fruits.  Ruby Frost was a 17-year process, while the SnapDragon
required 12 years.  That may sound like a long time, but it’s fairly standard—even a
little fast—in the world of apple breeding.”); Parks, supra note 235 (“It takes
20,000 seeds and young seedlings to find one variety we release to the
public . . . .”).
328. U.S. Plant Patent No. 24,579 (issued July 1, 2014).
329. Leslie Mertz, EverCrisp Ramps Up: Midwest Apple Improvement Association
Marketing Its First New Apple, GOOD FRUIT GROWER (June 13, 2018), https://
www.goodfruit.com/evercrisp-release-ramps-up/ [https://perma.cc/3JE6-2FK4].
On March 15, 2012, MAIA applied for a trademark on the mark EverCrisp.  The
trademark registration states that the mark was first used in commerce on April 15,
2015. See EVERCRISP, Registration No. 4,777,474.
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the option to license the trees from MAIA.  Because the trees are licensed
from MAIA and not purchased, the trees remain (at all times) the prop-
erty of MAIA—as do any improvements, developments, sports, or muta-
tions of the trees.330  Nurseries agreeing to the terms of the license
acknowledge that they will distribute the apples grown on the licensed
trees by “using only the [specified] Trademarks and Logos . . .  Use of
other names and marks . . . is expressly prohibited and will constitute a
material breach of this Agreement.”331  A royalty fee of $1 per tree is
charged at the time of purchase.332  For the duration of the plant patent,
which does not expire until 2032, all patented plants can only be grown
with a license from MAIA, giving MAIA this period of exclusivity to de-
velop its brand in the eyes of the consumer.  When the patent term ex-
pires, there will be no noticeable difference to consumers, as MAIA will
still manage all EverCrisp trees.  There is no concept of a set of rights for a
limited time in this arrangement.  Private ordering has grafted contract
limitations onto public ordering to circumvent the temporal limitations of
patent protection.
Using a patent term to build the public trust in the trademark during
the patent’s duration allows the trademark owner to use the power of the
right to exclude to create an unlimited right to exclude others from using
the innovation.  Trademark law and patent law protect different interests,
and when public ordering works well, they coexist to promote the public’s
interest.  However, when a brand is covered by a trademark, a patent and a
license that ties the patent license to a trademark license and takes a roy-
alty beyond the patent term denies the public the benefit of the innova-
tion—despite having given the innovator the full reward reaped through a
patent.333
Such private ordering is against the public’s interest, violates public
policy, and is not enforceable.  The bargain struck between the trademark
owner and the public is a different bargain than that struck between the
patentee and the public.  Trademarks serve to protect the public and pro-
vide a shortcut for the public to identify the source of a good.  Allowing a
trademark to limit the public’s access to a product covered by an expired
patent, renders the trademark an innovator-identifier, not a source-identi-
fier.  The use of trademarks to extend the protection granted to plants
harms the public’s interest.  Patent rights are granted for a limited time,
and circumvention of that grant through private ordering renders mute
that limitation.
330. License Agreement Between MAIA and Tree Purchasers, MIDWEST APPLE IM-
PROVEMENT ASS’N, http://maiaapples.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/12/2021-
Continuous-License-Agreement-For-Growers.pdf [https://perma.cc/3F3Q-TR7A]
(last visited Jan. 31, 2021).
331. Id.
332. Id.
333. This is a problem. See, e.g., Kellogg Co. v. Nat’l Biscuit Co., 305 U.S. 111,
119–20 (1938); Singer Mfg. Co. v. June Mfg. Co., 163 U.S. 169, 185 (1896).
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In 1896, the Supreme Court decided that the “Singer” brand could
not serve as a trademark.334  Singer built, patented, and marketed the first
practical sewing machines.335  After the relevant patents expired, Singer
brought an action against June Manufacturing for trademark infringe-
ment.336  In the opinion of the court, there was a “strong implication” that
the use of the mark Singer on the patented sewing machine after the term
of the patent had expired was done “in order . . . to retain in the posses-
sion of the company the real fruits of the monopoly when that monopoly
had passed away.”337  The Supreme Court held that the public has the
right to use the knowledge contained within a patent upon the expiration
of the patent term, and, implicit in that right, is the right to use the name
with which the article has become known during the patent.338
To say otherwise would be to hold that, although the public had
acquired the device covered by the patent, yet the owner of the
patent or the manufacturer of the patented thing had retained
the designated name which was essentially necessary to vest the
public with the full enjoyment of that which had become theirs
by the disappearance of the monopoly.339
In 1938, the Supreme Court was faced with the question of whether
the National Biscuit Company had the exclusive right to use the trade
name “Shredded Wheat.”340  The shredded wheat biscuit was invented by
Henry Perky, introduced to the public as shredded wheat in 1893, and
patented in 1895.341  In 1938, the breakfast cereal had been known exclu-
sively as shredded wheat for almost half a century, long after the end of
the patent term.342  The Supreme Court found that the expiration of the
patent dedicated to the public, “not only the right to make the article as it
was made during the patent period, but also the right to apply thereto the
name by which it had become known,” and National Biscuit Company had
no exclusive right to the trade name “Shredded Wheat.”343
The apple is no different.  It is wrong for innovators to use a patent’s
term to develop secondary meaning in a trademark, thus, extending the
holder’s rights.344  Courts must guarantee a patent term’s expiration then
334. Singer, 163 U.S. at 185.
335. Id. at 178.
336. Id. at 169 (explaining June marked its sewing machines as “Improved
Singer” machines).
337. Id. at 181.
338. Id. at 185.
339. Id.
340. Kellogg Co. v. Nat’l Biscuit Co., 305 U.S. 111, 113 (1938).
341. Id. at 111–13.
342. Id. at 112.
343. Id. at 113.
344. See Amiesite Asphalt Co. of Am. v. Interstate Amiesite Co., 72 F.2d 946,
948 (3d Cir. 1934) (“Patent monopoly and trade-name monopoly started and en-
ded together.”).
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dedicates the patented article to the public.  To hold otherwise is to upset
the fundamental balance inherent in our intellectual property system.  It is
elemental in the law of trademarks that a generic term cannot be pro-
tected.345  If a plant variety has no known appellation other than the arbi-
trary mark given to it by its developer, and the connection between that
mark and the variety is developed during the protection for the intellec-
tual property contained within the variety, then the appellation has be-
come generic for the variety in question.  To find otherwise is to inhibit
free speech and to extend the patent term far beyond the limited reward
granted thereby.  When the National Biscuit Company claimed the exclu-
sive right to sell “Shredded Wheat” simply by the possession of the trade
name, the Supreme Court rightly held they could not so extend the patent
term.346
Trademark law protects only the brand and the goodwill associated
with the brand, not the intellectual property associated with the seed itself.
If the only information conveyed to the consumer by the brand is what the
product is, and not what the source of the product is, then the brand is
not a trademark.  When the plant, its progeny, and the product are all
identical, this creates significant issues with trademarking and branding
plants.  As a result, varietal names, even if arbitrary in their branding,
often describe a product to the consumer and not a source.347  The use of
private ordering to restrict the use of a merely descriptive brand by grow-
ers cannot be enforced.  If the product is patented, then for the duration
of the patent, the patentee has the right to exclude others from making,
using, or selling the patented product without permission.  As discussed,
breeders rely on patent rights to accustom the consumer and growers to
refer to a variety by name, rather than referring to the source of the name.
If this happens during the patent term, the brand may have become ge-
neric. The patent does not exist to protect the brand, only the innovation
itself.  If the name is associated with the source only because of the limita-
tions of the licensing, then public policy dictates that the breeder cannot
restrict others’ use of the name once the breeder’s limited right to ex-
clude others has expired.348
345. See, e.g., Park’N’Fly, Inc. v. Dollar Park & Fly, Inc., 718 F.2d 327, 329 (9th
Cir. 1983).
346. Kellogg Co., 305 U.S. at 115.
347. In re Farmer Seed & Nursery Co., 137 U.S.P.Q. 231, 232 (T.T.A.B. 1963)
(“Manifestly, any rights which applicant enjoys in the [arbitrary variety name of
the] plant derives from its patent since others are prohibited from growing and
selling this variety during the life of said patent.  To grant applicant a registration
of this designation with all the statutory presumptions accruing therefrom would
be inconsistent with the right which others will have upon the expiration of the
patent not only to grow and sell the plant but also to use [the arbitrary name in
question] as the varietal name thereof.”).
348. In re Cooper, 254 F.2d 611, 612 (C.C.P.A. 1958) (“[T]he book contains a
single story, the name of the story is TEENY-BIG, the title of the book is TEENY-
BIG and the book has no other name, title, subtitle or any other designation ex-
cept its generic name ‘book.’”).
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In tying a trademark to a patent, the apple breeder retains exclusive
rights to the mark only so long as the patent remains valid.349  If patent
protection does not provide the protection needed to promote innovation
in the apple orchards, then innovators can rely solely on trademark pro-
tection.350  Many apples are not the subject of multiple forms of intellec-
tual property protection.  Allowing trademark licenses on such apples
violates no public policy.  Using trademark licenses to augment and cir-
cumvent the patent system, however, vitiates the limited right to exclude
others.  A brand cannot be patented, and the patent laws do not exist to
protect a brand.  The use of licenses to circumvent public legislation frus-
trates the balance inherent in that legislation and harms the public
interest.351
The Switzer brothers made and sold fluorescent paint under the reg-
istered trademark “Day-Glo.”  The method of making the paint was pat-
ented.352  The Switzer brothers widely licensed the patent and required all
licensees to license the trademark as well.353  The patent license expressly
conditioned the agreement on the trademark license, and anyone who
wished to license the patent had to license the trademark as well.354  The
arrangement had an adverse effect on competition, and there were no
efficiency justifications for such an arrangement.355  The patent and the
trademark are two separate items, regulated by two separate bodies of law,
even if applied to the same physical product.  Tying the trademark to the
patent was held to be anticompetitive by the Seventh Circuit.356  In the
modern fruit orchard, where an apple may be the subject of a patent and
bear a trademarked brand, licensors must be careful not to tie the brand
to the patent license, nor condition the patent license upon the accept-
349. See Kellogg Co., 305 U.S. at 118.
350. Id.
351. See Mark A. Lemley, Intellectual Property and Shrinkwrap Licenses, 68 S. CAL.
L. REV. 1239, 1251 (1995).
352. U.S. Patent No. 2,475,529 (issued July 5, 1949).
353. Switzer Bros., Inc. v. Locklin, 297 F.2d 39, 41–42 (7th Cir. 1961) (“Under
contracts with Sherwin-Williams Company and other manufacturers of pigments,
papers and inks, Switzer licensed each manufacturer to use the Switzer patents
upon consideration of the manufacturers’ agreements that they would market all
fluorescent materials manufactured by them under the Day-Glo mark and would
sell such materials only to Switzer licensed dealers and end-use device manufactur-
ers.  The manufacturers were authorized, with Switzer’s approval, to enter into li-
censing agreements with dealers and end-users.”).
354. Id. at 43–44 (“The basic licenses used by [the Switzer brothers] tie the
right to the use of patents to the use of the Day-Glo trademark. . . .  The patent
licenses were conditioned upon the use of the Day-Glo mark.”).
355. Id.
356. Id. at 41–42.
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ance of the trademark.357  To do so may have the effect of lessening com-
petition in the industry and place undue restraints on trade.358
Limiting such licenses is necessary.  Language tying trademark li-
censes to patented agrobiotechnology innovations is becoming increas-
ingly common.  Granted, tying is presumed unlawful only when the party
engaged in the tying practice has market power.359  Furthermore, a patent
does not bring with it a presumption of market power, and a grower can
indeed choose to not grow a patented agricultural product if that grower
does not wish to.360  That being said, contracts that tie a trademark license
to a patent license cannot be enforced as they vest the brands with an
artificial value over and above the goodwill normally imbued in a
brand.361  If there is market demand for the use of a brand, licensees must
357. For instance, Brandt’s Fruit Trees, Inc. grants growers non-exclusive li-
censes under Plant Patent 24,408 (the ‘408 Patent) to grow the PremP109 pear.
The PremP109 pear is marketed under the trademark “Reddy Robin.”  Growers
who license the PremP109 pear from Brandt agree “to market and sell the Li-
censed Pears only in the Direct Market Grower segment that includes local
farmer’s markets in Grower’s community, subject to the requirement that Grower
must use the REDDY ROBIN™ trademarks with all Licensed Pears that are pro-
duced by Grower that meet a minimum of U.S.  Fancy grade standards.”  A two-
part royalty is then set forth in this contract—a one-time tree royalty for the license
to the scionwood, and a recurring fruit production royalty fee.  The failure to com-
ply with this requirement is contractually described as infringement.  This contract
is not atypical—containing language very similar to contracts promulgated by
MAIA and Washington State for their patented apples.  In order to license the
patented technology inherent in the PremP109 pear, the grower must also agree
to license the trademark, whether the grower would prefer to label the PremP109
pears with the Reddy Robin brand or not. PROPRIETARY VARIETY MGMT., LLC,
REDDY ROBIN™ BRAND U.S. PLANT PATENT AND TRADEMARK LICENSE, https://
provarmanagement.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/02/ReddyRobin-Farmgate-
Contract.pdf [https://perma.cc/AHU7-QLKJ] (last visited Jan. 31, 2021); see also
WASH. STATE UNIV., FARMGATE ADDENDUM TO NON-EXCLUSIVE GROWER AGREEMENT,
https://provarmanagement.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/02/WA38-farmgate-
contract.pdf [https://perma.cc/T8R2-ZZA5] (last visited Jan. 31, 2021).
358. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2018); see also Jack Winter, Inc. v. Koratron Co., Inc., 375
F. Supp. 1, 62 (N.D. Cal. 1974) (“Koratron’s licensing practice of requiring its
licensed textile mills and manufacturers of accessories to sell Koratron-labeled
products only to its licensed garment makers also constitutes a tying arrangement.
In this instance, the tying product is the Koratron trademark and the tied product
is its patented process.  A textile mill wishing to utilize Koratron’s trademark had
to agree to sell Koratron-labeled fabrics only to Koratron’s licensed garment mak-
ers.  Pressure would thus be applied to garment makers inducing them to become
or remain . . . patent licensees.” (footnote omitted)).
359. Ill. Tool Works Inc. v. Indep. Ink, Inc., 547 U.S. 28, 44 (2006).
360. Id.  Typically, tying is thought of when dealing with patented and unpat-
ented products—however, tying can also occur when the grant of a patent license
is conditioned upon the licensee accepting the trademark, as is the case here. See
Switzer Bros., Inc., 297 F.2d at 44.
361. Washington State University includes the following language in the Cos-
mic Crisp license agreement:
Grower may only use the Trademark for whole fruit grown from Licensed
Trees that are U.S. Fancy grade or better and that otherwise meet re-
quired quality standards for the brand.  The license may be terminated in
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not be pressured into licensing the patent as well.  The rights associated
with a patent and a brand are fundamentally different.  A patent grants a
right for a limited time, and the use of private ordering to circumvent that
limitation frustrates the bargain inherent in the grant of a patent.362
Contracts have changed the very definitions of consumption and
competition.  Private ordering, when limited in its scope and application,
can successfully balance the costs of the reward with the costs of the inno-
vation.  But the use of private ordering to replace public ordering in-
creases the costs of protection while decreasing the benefit to society.
Using private ordering to exclude others to restrain trade, elevate already-
heightened barriers to entry, restrict output, and limit competitors’ re-
search and development does not promote consumer welfare.
2. Carving Up the Culinary Arts
As noted above, chefs rely mainly on self-regulation to promote inno-
vation.363  That, along with the poor fit of copyright law and the culinary
arts, has led to gaps in the formal protection of the culinary arts.364  Res-
taurants and their investors have leapt into this gap and are relying heavily
on private ordering to control chefs, the recipes, and the trade secrets that
are essential to the culinary arts.365  Such private ordering must be moni-
tored to ensure that there is a bargained-for exchange, with particular at-
tention being paid to the sous-chefs and employees who lack bargaining
power.366  The truth is, public ordering protects the public, while private
ordering protects the successful.
the event of any conduct by Grower that would create material risks to
Washington State University’s Trademark rights.  Any fruit grown on the
Licensed Trees that does not meet the grade and quality standards may
only be used, consumed, or sold for processing. Grower must positively
support and promote COSMIC CRISP TM Brand as a trademark, and not
as a varietal name, and must always use the Trademark as in one of the
following examples:
  COSMIC CRISP TM Brand
  COSMIC CRISP TM Brand WA 38 cv.
  COSMIC CRISP TM Brand WA 38 variety
WASH. STATE UNIV., supra note 357.
362. In the 1940s and 1950s, Switzer Brothers, the owner of several patents
relating to the manufacture of daylight fluorescent devices and the trademark
“Day-Glo,” extensively licensed their patented technology and required all licen-
sees to mark all products with the “Day-Glo” brand. Switzer Bros., Inc., 297 F.2d at
41.  The Seventh Circuit found that Switzer had tied the “right to the use of pat-
ents to the use of the Day-Glo trademark, and both to the exclusive use of Switzer
produced, or Switzer approved materials.  The combination thereof is, per se, a
violation of the antitrust laws . . . .” Id. at 43–44 (citations omitted).
363. See Wells, supra note 182 (“[Chef] Grant Achatz . . . is against a copyright
system for food. ‘Chefs won’t use it,’ Achatz says.  ‘Can you imagine Thomas Keller
calling me and saying, “Grant, I need to license your Black Truffle Explosion so I
can put that on my menu”?’”).
364. See supra Section II.C.
365. Id.
366. See Wells, supra note 182.
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Restaurants rely on private ordering to ensure that if there are crea-
tive differences with the chef, the restaurant can retain the signature
dishes created by the chef for the restaurant.367  What would Serendipity
be, for instance, without frozen hot chocolate?368  This language may be
part of a non-compete—like the one addressed in the Jimmy John’s discus-
sion above—it may be part of the initial contract—like that signed by Chef
Leonti— or it may be its own contract.  Rather than augmenting the in-
dustry norms and complementing public ordering, such private ordering
circumvents and violates these forms of protection.  Allocating ownership
of the recipe to the restaurant renders chefs less artists and more mechan-
ics.  The question of ownership of innovation shifts and changes through
this private ordering, placing the public’s interest at risk.
If a dish is not original enough to warrant copyright protection, not
innovative enough to be patentable, and yet, generates market demand,
why should that market be controlled through non-compete agreements
for which the chefs are not bargaining?  If a restaurant claims ownership
in a dish, and industry standards suggest one chef should share recipe
details with another chef, that chef must choose between violating their
contract with the restaurant or violating the social norms of the kitchen.
Limiting enforcement of such licenses will only enhance the protections
offered to all parties.
CONCLUSION
When private ordering and public ordering work together to pro-
mote innovation while protecting the public interest, then the private or-
dering should be enforced.  In contrast, using private ordering to take
advantage of the incentives offered by public ordering while circum-
venting its inherent limitations violates the fundamental bargain essential
to public ordering.  Public ordering presents a balance between the pub-
lic’s interest in accessing the invention and the private party’s interest in
protecting their investment.  Protecting that investment incentivizes both
innovation and disclosure.
Private ordering favors the successful.  Public ordering helps level the
playing field.  A successful innovator who possesses a desired item is far
better able to negotiate terms regarding access to that item than an inno-
vator who is new to the field.  Strong statutory protection should, ideally,
enhance the bargaining position of the innovator and favor the public
regardless of that innovator’s previous success.
367. See, e.g., Becky Krystal, A Celebrated Chef Just Left His Restaurant.  So Who
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Intellectual property innovators use contracts to impose numerous
additional limitations on those to whom the innovation is transferred with-
out the accompanying title.  Such contracts not only restrict the rights of
licensees but also extend the intellectual property owner’s rights in poten-
tially lucrative ways.  Intellectual property owners include such clauses
when the value of the expression of the protected idea exceeds the reward
promised by public legislation.  The balance continues to be skewed in
favor of intellectual property owners and against potential licensees, hin-
dering progress and frustrating the purposes of both private and public
legislation.
The traditional publicly ordered norms of intellectual property do
not adequately protect and promote innovation in all areas.  Innovators
are turning to private ordering to protect their progress and promote
their bottom line.  When intellectual property owners use private ordering
to supplement their intellectual property rights, then the system may be
working.  Increasingly, however, private ordering is being used to circum-
vent publicly legislated restrictions and bypass public ordering altogether.
Protecting intellectual property owners’ rights to contract must be bal-
anced with protecting the public’s interest in the promotion of science
and the useful arts.  Public ordering is not a perfect fit for all innovation;
but if legislative protection has determined that the public interest is best
met by not providing intellectual property protection in a field, then pri-
vate ordering is against public policy and should not be enforced.
Private ordering cannot create a private monopoly over intellectual
property.369  Bargaining for innovation requires (1) limiting licenses to
those that do not run counter to the public’s interest, (2) litigating limita-
tions to clarify the protections of trademark and copyright law, and (3)
codifying changes that enhance the rights of the public and innovators
both.  Public ordering shifts and changes in the scope of its protection,
rendering it ever more challenging to determine what falls under the
scope of patentable subject matter, limiting the extent of copyright in-
fringement,370 and eroding trademark protection.371  Contracting around
public ordering plays a role in incentivizing innovation, however, that role
must be limited by the central authority of the courts.  There is no ques-
tion that in some arts the market is broken.372  Software, print media, the
culinary arts, and comedy are all industries, like the agriculture field,
369. Millinery Creators’ Guild v. FTC, 109 F.2d 175, 177 (2d Cir. 1940), aff’d,
312 U.S. 469 (1941).
370. See, e.g., Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 568 U.S. 519 (2013).
371. See generally Christian Louboutin S.A. v. Yves Saint Laurent Am. Holding,
Inc., 696 F.3d 206 (2d Cir. 2012).
372. For instance, in the academic textbook market, students, unwilling or
unable to pay the high costs of textbooks, can access caches of online textbooks
and books commonly assigned as required reading, known as “pirate libraries.”
Grace Elletson, ‘Pirate Libraries’ Find a Market Among Students Seeking to Avoid High
Textbook Prices, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC. (Oct. 13, 2019), https://www.chronicle.
com/article/Pirate-Libraries-Find-a/247304 [https://perma.cc/L48Y-U7PG].
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where innovation and public ordering are a poor fit.  In each of these
industries, there is market demand and innovation; but the question re-
mains how best to protect and promote the progress of science and the
useful arts.
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